Confirmation theory and indispensability

Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19 (1999)
Authors
Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney
Abstract
In this paper I examine Quine''s indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by ''indispensable''. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine''s argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004248218844
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,507
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Naturalism and Abstract Entities.Feng Ye - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):129-146.
Intrinsic Explanation and Field’s Dispensabilist Strategy.Russell Marcus - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163-183.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument.Lieven Decock - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):231-250.
Living in Harmony: Nominalism and the Explanationist Argument for Realism.Juha Saatsi - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (1):19 – 33.
Indispensability and Holism.Jacob Busch - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):47-59.
In Defence of Indispensability.Mark Colyvan - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
460 ( #6,546 of 2,268,067 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #106,354 of 2,268,067 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature