Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62 (1998)

Authors
Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney
Abstract
Indispensability arguments for realism about mathematical entities have come under serious attack in recent years. To my mind the most profound attack has come from Penelope Maddy, who argues that scientific/mathematical practice doesn't support the key premise of the indispensability argument, that is, that we ought to have ontological commitment to those entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories. In this paper I defend the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument against Maddy's objections.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/6.1.39
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References found in this work BETA

Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Whitehall Putnam - 1971 - London: Allen & Unwin.
Philosophy of Logic.Hilary Whitehall Putnam - 1971 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA

There is No Easy Road to Nominalism.M. Colyvan - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):285-306.
The Identity Problem for Realist Structuralism.J. Keranen - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):308--330.
Can the Eleatic Principle Be Justified?Mark Colyvan - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):313-335.
Contingentism in Metaphysics.Kristie Miller - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):965-977.

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