The Free Will Theorem

Foundations of Physics 36 (10):1441-1473 (2006)
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Abstract

On the basis of three physical axioms, we prove that if the choice of a particular type of spin 1 experiment is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then its outcome is equally not a function of the information accessible to the particles. We show that this result is robust, and deduce that neither hidden variable theories nor mechanisms of the GRW type for wave function collapse can be made relativistic and causal. We also establish the consistency of our axioms and discuss the philosophical implications

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Citations of this work

Collapse theories.Giancarlo Ghirardi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.
Metaphysics of science as naturalized metaphysics.Michael Esfeld - 2018 - In Anouk Barberousse, Denis Bonnay & Mikael Cozic (eds.), The philosophy of science. A companion. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 142-170.
Randomness? What Randomness?Klaas Landsman - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (2):61-104.

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