Purpose and Teleology

The Monist 52 (3):317-328 (1968)
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Abstract

We are witnessing at present a substantial efflorescence of the view that there are and must necessarily be fundamental differences between the methods—and especially the types of explanation—appropriate to the social sciences on the one hand and those appropriate to the natural sciences on the other. New and ever more subtle arguments seeking to re-establish a Geisteswissenschaften vs. Naturwissenschaften distinction are flowing from scholarly presses in ever greater volume. The works cited in footnote one are a mere sample just of recent books which, while diverse to the point of contradiction in some respects, have as their common underlying theme the defense of such a methodological duality.

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Citations of this work

On the post-Wittgensteinian critique of the concept of action in sociology.Douglas V. Porpora - 1983 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 13 (2):129–146.
From an intentionalist perspective.Richard L. Smith - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):1 – 22.
Wimsatt on Function Statements.Lowell Nissen - 1977 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 8 (4):341.

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