On Russell's Principle of Induction

Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295 (1991)
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Abstract

An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.

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References found in this work

The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
Sour grapes: studies in the subversion of rationality.Jon Elster - 1983 - Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme.
Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pragmatic Probability.Newton C. A. Da Costa - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (2):141 - 162.

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