Abstract

In this study I examine the relations between our meta-physical conception of the self and our everyday conception of a self for practical and moral purposes through a discussion of recent work by Derek Parfit and several of his critics. I defend the principle---implicit in Parfit's argument---that our beliefs about the nature of persons can have bearing upon practical and moral attitudes. I defend it first against Bernard Williams's objection that the conditions of having any sort of practical life at all are incompatible with Parfit's view that one's later self may be a numerically different person than one's present self. I argue that Williams fails to show that a pragmatic conception of the self organized around an agent's most important projects should not take into account our beliefs about our metaphysical nature. Next I consider Christine Korsgaard's objection that non-metaphysical considerations are sufficient both to reconstruct our usual sense of a practical self to support a Kantian conception of moral rights. In my view, an ethical theory that places great emphasis on the concept of respect for persons relies to some extent on metaphysical assumptions about what a person is. Third, I oppose Mark Johnston's Minimalist skepticism regarding the inference from metaphysical premises to conclusions about practical justification. I maintain that even a natural and fundamental practice starts out with a presumption in favor of its being justified, it doesn't follow from this that metaphysical considerations cannot count against that presumption. ;I try to apply a single method to all the authors I discuss here. Where claims sweep wide of the truth, I attempt to tell in which respects they are accurate and in which they distort. This goes for Parfit as well as for his critics; quite a few of his conclusions overreach what his arguments show. I conclude my study with a brief discussion of why, although certain principles upon which he relies are defensible, his overall argument is by no means home free