Abstract

Many contemporary ethical theories are unable to adequately deal with the classic question "Why be moral?" In response, I maintain that being true to one's self has its own moral significance, and that an individual's honest conception of being the best person he/she can be is sufficient for generating moral duties. By grounding the moral principle of universalizability on classical egoist foundations, one can defend morality without metaphysical extravagance and without undermining personal projects. Morality cannot conflict with our most deeply cherished projects, on my view, because being a good person is one of our most deeply cherished projects. ;I start by defending the significance of the question "Why be moral?" explaining why it cannot be so easily answered as is sometimes supposed. I take it that anyone has a reason to act as she desires. In our desires and projects, we all immediately encounter reasons for action which are allegedly unlike moral reasons, and which are often in conflict with moral reasons, so anyone engaged in diligent deliberation should eventually wonder "Why be moral?" Next, I investigate desires, and argue that the rational pursuit of desire requires some standard for evaluating one's desires apart from their mere strength. I argue that successful conceptions of the good are coherent, authoritative grounds of first-person identity which generate reasons for action which are not "merely" instrumental to the satisfaction of desire or happiness. Rather, pursuit of one's conception of the good is the pursuit of one's rational self-interest. Next, I argue that consequentialism and deontology generally lack the resources to justify morality, since each tends to undermine the pursuit of one's conception of the good. I propose a better theory of moral obligation which rejects reasons external to the agent yet binding on her. Instead, the agent's own desire to be the best person she can be, embodied in her conception of the good, generates reasons for right behavior. Finally, I discuss the significant theoretical advantages of ethical individualism