The Theory of Motivating States

In Practical Reality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2000)
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Abstract

Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.

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Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin

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