A framework for conscious information processing

Abstract

This paper exploits the fact that the variability in the inter-spike intervals, in the spike train issuing from a neuron, carries substantial information regarding the input to the neuron. A framework for neuronal information processing is proposed which utilizes the above fact to distinguish phenomenal from non-phenomenal mental representation. In the process, an explanation is offered as to what is it, in the nature of conscious mental states, that imparts them a subjective feeling – there is something it is like to be in those mental states. To give empirical support, it is shown how the proposed framework can neatly explain, the delay in eliciting conscious awareness as observed by Libet and the related backwards referral in time.

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Author's Profile

Balaram Das
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur (PhD)

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.

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