Self-consciousness and phenomenal character

Dialogue 44 (4):707-733 (2005)
Abstract
This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves self-consciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a dearth of direct arguments for them in the scholarly literature and the relationship between them has so far gone underrecognized. This article attempts to remedy this lack, advancing the claim that if all conscious states have phenomenal character, then all state consciousness involves self-consciousness.
Keywords Consciousness  Mental States  Metaphysics  Representation  Self-consciousness
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300000056
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References found in this work BETA
What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Phenomenal Character as Implicit Self-Awareness.Greg Janzen - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):44-73.
In Defense of the What-It-is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.

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