The two senses of desire

Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195 (1984)
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Abstract

It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.

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Wayne Davis
Georgetown University

Citations of this work

Two Ways to Want?Ethan Jerzak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (2):65-98.
Desiderative Lockeanism.Milo Phillips-Brown - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
The Language of Morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1952 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
The language of morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.

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