Ratio 26 (1):35-50 (2013)

Authors
Craig DeLancey
State University of New York at Oswego
Abstract
This paper explores consequences of the claim that phenomenal experiences are physical events of great descriptive complexity. This claim is attractive both because it can explain our most perplexing intuitions about the quality of consciousness and also because it is suggestive of very productive research opportunities. I illustrate the former by showing that two of the most compelling anti-physicalist arguments about phenomenal experience – the modal argument of Kripke and the conceivability argument of Chalmers – are not sound if this claim is true. I illustrate the latter by showing that significant empirical predictions are a consequence of this claim
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00525.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,268
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Consciousness and the Superfunctionality Claim.Craig DeLancey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (3):433-451.
Adaptive Complexity and Phenomenal Consciousness.Shaun Nichols & Todd Grantham - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):648-670.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 26 (2):391-402.
The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Reply to Shriver and Allen.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):113-122.
Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. [REVIEW]David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-02-10

Total views
75 ( #141,613 of 2,444,935 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #457,173 of 2,444,935 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes