The modal arguments and the complexity of consciousness

Ratio 26 (1):35-50 (2013)
Abstract
This paper explores consequences of the claim that phenomenal experiences are physical events of great descriptive complexity. This claim is attractive both because it can explain our most perplexing intuitions about the quality of consciousness and also because it is suggestive of very productive research opportunities. I illustrate the former by showing that two of the most compelling anti-physicalist arguments about phenomenal experience – the modal argument of Kripke and the conceivability argument of Chalmers – are not sound if this claim is true. I illustrate the latter by showing that significant empirical predictions are a consequence of this claim
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00525.x
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