Probability kinematics and representation of belief change

Philosophy of Science 47 (3):384-403 (1980)
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Abstract

Bayesian, Jeffrey and Field conditionals are compared and it is shown why the last two cannot be reduced to the first. Maximum relative entropy is used in two kinds of justification of the Field conditional and the dispensability of entropy principles in general is discussed

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Citations of this work

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Learning from experience and conditionalization.Peter Brössel - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2797-2823.
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Probability kinematics and commutativity.Carl G. Wagner - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):266-278.

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References found in this work

A note on Jeffrey conditionalization.Hartry Field - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (3):361-367.
Bayesian conditionalisation and the principle of minimum information.P. M. Williams - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31 (2):131-144.
Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics.Bas C. Fraassevann - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):165-.

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