Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):487-497 (2011)

Authors
Igor Douven
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
It is known that evidential support, on the Bayesian definition of this notion, is intransitive. According to some, however, the Bayesian definition is too weak to be materially adequate. This paper investigates whether evidential support is transitive on some plausible probabilistic strengthening of that definition. It is shown that the answer is negative. In fact, it will appear that even under conditions under which the Bayesian notion of evidential support is transitive, the most plausible candidate strengthenings are not
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s1755020310000298
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,704
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Probability and the Art of Judgment.Richard Jeffrey - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Bootstrapping in General.Jonathan Weisberg - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):525-548.
You’Ve Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.
The Bootstrapping Problem.Jonathan Weisberg - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):597-610.
Dwindling Confirmation.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):114-137.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-01

Total views
62 ( #151,746 of 2,340,044 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #516,585 of 2,340,044 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes