Philosophy of Science 76 (5):701-711 (2009)

Phil Dowe
Australian National University
This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: [email protected]
Keywords Causation   Nonlocality   Preemption  2203 Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/605796
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,039
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):201-202.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Counterfactuals and Counterparts: Defending a Neo-Humean Theory of Causation.Neil McDonnell - 2015 - Dissertation, Macquarie University and University of Glasgow

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
61 ( #187,051 of 2,505,992 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,828 of 2,505,992 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes