Would‐cause semantics

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):701-711 (2009)
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Abstract

This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would‐cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal‐modeling approaches do not have these problems. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia; e‐mail: [email protected].

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Phil Dowe
Australian National University

References found in this work

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):201-202.
Contrastive causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.

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