Informal Logic 23 (1) (2003)

Abstract
A critical examination of the dialectical approach, focusing on a comparison ofthe illative and the dialectical definitions of argument. I distinguish a moderate, a strong and a hyper dialectical conception of argument. I critique Goldman's argument for the moderate conception and Johnson's argument for the strong conception, and argue that the moderate conception is correct.
Keywords argument, argumentation, argument evaluation, dialectical, dialectics, definitions of argument, illative, informal logic, Ralph H. Johnson, Alvin I. Goldman
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Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.

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