Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):213 – 228 (2006)

Abstract
Armstrong holds the Supervenience Theory of instantiation, namely that the instantiation of universals by particulars supervenes upon what particulars and what universals there are, where supervenience is stipulated to be explanatory or dependent supervenience. I begin by rejecting the Supervenience Theory of instantiation. Having done so it is then tempting to take instantiation as primitive. This has, however, an awkward consequence, undermining one of the main advantages universals have over tropes. So I examine another account hinted at by Armstrong. This is the Operator Theory of instantiation, by which I mean the theory that universals are operators, and that a particular instantiates a monadic universal because the universal operates on the particular, resulting in the state of affairs. On this theory the state of affairs supervenes on the instantiation rather than vice versa. In the second part of the paper I develop this theory of universals as operators, including an account of structural universals, which are useful for accounts of modality and of mathematics.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00048400600759001
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,636
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.

View all 33 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Properties.Francesco Orilia & Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Prioritizing Platonism.Kelly Trogdon & Sam Cowling - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2029-2042.
Mereological Nominalism.Nikk Effingham - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):160-185.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

"Bare Particulars".Theodore Sider - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
The Co-Instantiation Thesis.Ann Whittle - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):61 – 79.
Instantiation is Not Partial Identity.Nicholas Mantegani - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):697-715.
Universals: Ways or Things?Scott Berman - 2008 - Metaphysica 9 (2):219-234.
Structural Universals and Formal Relations.Joan Pagés - 2002 - Synthese 131 (2):215 - 221.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
107 ( #103,828 of 2,462,271 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #299,152 of 2,462,271 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes