Universals

If one had all the true particular statements that there are would such a collection be deficient for the purpose of science? In particular, would we still require a type of explanation that requires irreducible appeal to universals, and modalities. An argument to this conclusion is examined. In the situation envisaged, the realists needed distinctions such as between accidental and essential properties, or generalizations that are accidently true and those that are lawful and true, cannot be made. The argument then (...) is rejected: appeal to universals, and the need for explanations td tell us what might have happened, cannot be secured when science no longer need discover the truth about the world. Particulars maintain their claim to epistemological and ontological priority over universals. (shrink)

The pair democreteanism-Platonism (nothing/something is outside space-Time) differs from the pair nominalism-Realism (universals are/are not nameable entities). Nominalism need not be democretean, And democreateanism is nominalist only if conceptualism is rejected. Putnam's critique of nominalism is thus invalid. Quine's theory is democretean-When-Possible: quine is also a minimalist platonist. Conceptualists and realists agree that universals exist but not as physical objects. Nominalists accept universals only as "facons de parler".

Suarezii de formis, universalibus, notitia intellectiva sententiaSententia Suarezii circa quaestionem famosam de statu universalium variissimis modis ab diversis interpretibus exponi solet. In disertatio quidem proposita res paulo aliter pertractatur, a Suarezii metaphysica doctrina de formis substantialibus et de cognitione intellectiva ac sctientia exeundo. Quae Suarezii doctrinae diligenti analysi subiciuntur earumque conexio consideratur. Respectu quaestione supradicta, scil. quaenam fuit vera Suarezii de statu universalium sententia, arguitur, Suarezium nominalismum moderatum professum esse, quae conclusio suadetur ex doctrinis suis de formis substantialibus et de (...) cognitione intellectiva. Translatio: Lukáš NovákSuárez on Forms, Universals and UnderstandingThe interpretations in the secondary literature of Suárez’ position in the “classical” debate on the status of universals vary considerably. In this article, the problem is looked at from a slightly different angle: that of Suárez’ basic metaphysics of substantial forms and his views concerning understanding and knowledge. These areas of Suárez’ thought are thoroughly analysed and related to each other. Regarding the question of the status of universals it is argued that Suárez’ thought in the areas of substantial forms and of understanding generally supports the reading of Suarez as a “moderate nominalist”. (shrink)

The work presents the concept of a structural universal and the criticisms that have been leveled against it. A structural universal is a property had by an individual due to the nature of its proper parts and due to the relations obtaining between those parts. Mellor has argued that there is no reason to accept such universal in addition to the basic universals that compose them. David Lewis has argued –on the other hand– that it has not been satisfactorily explained (...) how universals are composed by other universals. The composition by which a structural universal is given cannot be a set-theoretical construction or a mereological sum. Several proposals to explain the nature of structural universals are discussed. Finally it is argued that a structural universal should be understood as a complexion of higher-order universals. (shrink)

What is it for a particular to have a property? many proposed analyses of this situation may be called relational accounts. The particular has some relation, R, To some entity p. R may be the relation of falling under, Being a member of, Resembling or "participating." p may be a predicate, A concept, A class, A paradigm instance or a form. A number of arguments seek to prove that all these accounts are involved in various vicious infinite regresses. These arguments (...) are classified, Their resemblances and differences noted, And their soundness assessed. (edited). (shrink)

In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and (...) rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy. (shrink)

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...) most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy. (shrink)

This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles (...) a realism about qualities and relations with an empiricist epistemology. The theory allows, too, for a convincing explanation of natural laws as relations between these universals. (shrink)

This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles (...) a realism about qualities and relations with an empiricist epistemology. The theory allows, too, for a convincing explanation of natural laws as relations between these universals. (shrink)

v. 1. Nominalism and realism.--v. 2. A theory of universals.

First, The doctrine of naturalism, That reality is spatio-Temporal, Is defended. Second, The doctrine of materialism or physicalism, That this spatio-Temporal reality involves nothing but the entities of physics working according to the principles of physics, Is defended. Third, It is argued that these doctrines do not constitute a "first philosophy." a satisfactory first philosophy should recognize universals, In the form of instantiated properties and relations. Laws of nature are constituted by relations between universals. What universals there are, And what (...) relations hold between them, Must be discovered "a posteriori" by scientific investigation. (shrink)

Many philosophers have declared that everything which exists is a particular. There is a weak interpretation of this doctrine which I believe to be a true proposition, and a strong one which I believe to be false.

In my reply to michael devitt, It is argued, First, That quine fails to appreciate the force of plato's "one over many" argument for universals. It is argued, Second, That quine's failure springs in part at least from his doctrine of ontological commitment: from the view that predicates need not be treated with ontological seriousness. Finally, An attempt is made to blunt the force of devitt's contention that realists cannot give a coherent explanation of the way that universals stand to (...) particulars. (shrink)

In considering the nature of properties four controversial decisions must be made. (1) Are properties universals or tropes? (2) Are properties attributes of particulars, or are particulars just bundles of properties? (3) Are properties categorical (qualitative) in nature, or are they powers? (4) If a property attaches to a particular, is this predication contingent, or is it necessary? These choices seem to be in a great degree independent of each other. The author indicates his own choices.