A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument

Journal of Philosophical Research 34:263-278 (2002)
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Abstract

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one

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Citations of this work

John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.

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References found in this work

Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The End of the World.John Leslie - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):155-158.
Time and the anthropic principle.John Leslie - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):521-540.

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