Several philosophical problems are based on an analogy between a real situation and a probabilistic model. Such problems are based on urn analogies. The present dissertation aims to describe and implement a methodology oriented towards the resolution of philosophical problems based on an urn analogy. This methodology is based on the use of the n-universes. To this end, I describe first the n-universes in a detailed way. I also discuss the difficulties of the theory of n-universes related to the demultiplication (...) of the criteria and to the relation one/many between the objects and a given criterion. On the one hand, I present an application of the framework of n-universes to the Doomsday argument and to the problems recently appeared in the literature in keeping with the Doomsday argument. My concern is also with showing how the application of the framework of n-universes to several problems and thought experiments related to the Doomsday argument helps clarifying the problem data and making disappear the associated ambiguity. I present then an analysis of the following problems related to the Doomsday argument: the two urn case, God's Coin Toss, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, the Presumptuous Philosopher, Lazy Adam, and the Shooting-Room Paradox. I present lastly a solution to the Doomsday argument, based on a third route, by contrast to two types of solutions classically described. On the other hand, I present an application of the framework of n-universes to Goodman's paradox. I replace first Goodman's statement in the framework of n-universes. I propose then a solution to the paradox, based on a distinction between two different modelizations of Goodman's statement in two structurally different n-universes. (shrink)

I present in this paper a line of refutation of the Simulation Argument. I recall first Bostrom's Simulation Argument. I draw then a comparison between the Emerald Case and the core analogy underlying the Simulation Argument. I also discuss the justification of the Self-Indication Assumption and its relationship with the Simulation Argument. I show lastly that the Simulation Argument is a disguised reformulation of an application of an extended form of the Self-Indication Assumption to the situation related to the Simulation (...) Argument. (shrink)

Je m'attache dans le présent article à élaborer la construction d'une classe générale de concepts, qui intègre notamment un certain nombre de contraires polarisés d'usage courant. Le point de départ de cette construction ne réside pas dans des concepts usuels, lexicalisés, c'est-à-dire pour lesquels il existe un mot correspondant dans le langage courant propre à une langue donnée. A l'inverse, la démarche qui préside à la construction de la présente classe de concepts consiste dans une définition abstraite de cette dernière, (...) sans considération du fait que les concepts correspondants soient ou non lexicalisés. Une fois une telle construction réalisée, on est alors à même de vérifier que les concepts ainsi construits correspondent effectivement à des concepts lexicalisés, alors que d'autres ne peuvent être mis en correspondance avec aucun mot du langage courant. Finalement, la présente construction permet de proposer une taxinomie de concepts qui constitue une alternative à celle basée sur le carré sémiotique (semiotic square) défini par Greimas. (shrink)

Le philosophe mit le pied sur la première marche du futurotron. C'était la première fois qu'il utilisait cet appareil pour ses recherches. Bien qu'il vienne seulement d'être mis au point et qu'il ne soit encore qu'à l'état de prototype, ce futurotron pouvait décidément rendre de grands services. De nombreux chercheurs de différentes disciplines l'avaient d'ailleurs déjà utilisé de manière très fructueuse. Le philosophe prit place aux côtés du pilote sur le siège avant de la machine. - Quel est le principe (...) de fonctionnement de la machine? demanda-t-il. - Ce serait un peu long à vous expliquer. C'est basé sur la mécanique quantique. Le pilote demanda, pressé: - Quelle époque avez-vous choisie? - Je souhaite effectuer une investigation en l'an 2150. Le pilote plaça le sélecteur sur l'année 2150. - Bien. Nous allons commencer. Etes-vous prêt? - Oui. Le futurotron se mit à ronronner. Un flash lumineux intense s'ensuivit. Au bout de quelques minutes, une image floue apparut sur l'écran géant du prototype. Peu à peu, l'image devint plus nette, et puis finalement parfaitement précise. Le philosophe se mit à observer l'écran avec une extrême acuité. Il distinguait nettement des êtres, d'apparence humaine, qui étaient assis dans ce qui semblait être une salle de conférences. En les regardant attentivement, il constata que ceux-ci présentaient les caractéristiques de notre espèce actuelle. Leur physionomie était humaine, mais pourtant il y avait chez eux quelque chose de différent... Dans ce qui paraissait être une projection publique, le philosophe distinguait nettement un faisceau lumineux et coloré qui provenait du front de l'un des êtres placé au centre de la salle, et s'élargissait pour former ce qui constituait l'image projetée d'une véritable scène tridimensionnelle. Les autres individus, assis autour, regardaient attentivement la scène. La projection était d'une netteté parfaite, et d'un réalisme saisissant. On y distinguait nettement deux personnes qui déambulaient en conversant, dans un paysage représentant une plage superbe, battue par les vagues. Le pilote interrompit soudain: - Voilà, c'est fini.. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more (...) adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one. (shrink)

Je présenterai dans ce qui suit un cadre conceptuel nouveau pour résoudre le « paradoxe de l’examen-surprise » , en ce sens qu’il réorganise en les adaptant plusieurs éléments de solution décrits dans la littérature. La solution proposée ici repose sur les éléments essentiels suivants : a) une distinction entre analyse moniste et dichotomique du paradoxe ; b) l’introduction d’une définition matricielle, qui sert de support à différentes variations du paradoxe ; c) la distinction entre une définition conjointe et disjointe (...) des cas de surprise et de non-surprise conduisant à deux notions structurellement distinctes de surprise.This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine’s solution applies to the version of the paradox corresponding to the conjoint structure. Lastly, I expose a solution to the paradox based on the disjoint structure. (shrink)

Goodman exprime ainsi GP à l’aide d’une induction énumérative. Et l’on peut modéliser GP en termes de SR. Si l’on prend pour la définition du prédicat «rouge», pour l’énumération des instances, pour la généralisation en résultant, et pour la prédiction correspondante, on a alors.

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to, on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and, on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their original models, which renders them less vulnerable to several objections. I then describe a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt’s models and fits more (...) adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy casts new light on the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more plausible than the original one. (shrink)

I describe in this paper a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual emerald case and discuss then Bostrom's Incubator gedanken. I address then the Sleeping Beauty problem. I argue that the root cause of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. I show that the same type of analysis also applies to Elga's version of the argument for 1/3. Lastly, I show that the core of the Sleeping (...) Beauty problem is related to the problem of world reduction. (shrink)

I describe in this paper the basic elements of the n-universes, a methodological tool originally introduced in Franceschi (2001) in the context of the study of Goodman's paradox. As the n-universes can be used in wide-ranging applications, such as thought experiments, I describe them from an essentially pragmatic standpoint, i.e. by describing accurately the step-by-step process which leads to a given modelisation.

The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions.

Attribué à Brandon Carter, l' argument de l'Apocalypse Doomsday Argument , soit DA, dans ce qui suit) a été décrit par John Leslie (1992). On peut formuler ainsi cet argument. Soit A l'événement: l'Apocalypse se produira avant l'an 2150 ; et B l'événement: l'Apocalypse ne se produira pas avant 2150 . Soit également Z l'événement: j'ai connu les années 1990 . On peut par ailleurs estimer à 40 milliards le nombre d'humains ayant existé depuis la naissance de l'humanité, jusqu'à notre (...) époque: soit H1996 un tel nombre. On peut ainsi admettre, de manière raisonnable, qu'un humain sur dix, dans le cas de l'événement.. (shrink)

I describe several applications of the theory of n-universes through several different probabilistic situations. I describe fi rst how n-universes can be used as an extension of the probability spaces used in probability theory. The extended probability spaces thus defined allow for a finer modeling of complex probabilistic situations and fi ts more intuitively with our intuitions related to our physical universe. I illustrate then the use of n-universes as a methodological tool, with two thought experiments described by John Leslie. (...) Lastly, I model Goodman’s paradox in the framework of n-universes while also showing how these latter appear finally very close to goodmanian worlds. (shrink)

In Franceschi (2002), I presented a theory based on the matrices of concepts aiming at providing an alternative to the classification proposed by Greimas, in the field of paradigmatic analysis. The problem of specifying the relationships of the concepts of love, hate and indifference, arises in this construction. I attach myself to describe the problem of the love-hate-indifference relationships in detail, and several solutions that have been proposed to solve it. Finally I expose a solution to this problem, based on (...) an extension of the theory of matrices of concepts. (shrink)

Infinite Minds is the fourth book of John Leslie, which follows Value and Existence (1979), Universes (1989) and The End of the World (1996). Infinite Minds presents a very rich content, and covers a number of particularly varied subjects . Among these latter, one can notably mention: omniscience, the problem of Evil, the fine-tuning argument, observational selection effects, the identity of indiscernables, time, infiniteness, the nature of consciousness.

I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the Entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the Entanglement urn have ontologically different properties form normal ones. The upshot is that I (...) endorse the halfer conclusion on the probability of Heads once beauty is awaken and the thirder conclusion on conditional probabilities, and that original conclusions ensue on the probability of waking on Monday. (shrink)

Attribué à Brandon Carter, l'argument de l'Apocalypse a été décrit par John Leslie. On peut formuler ainsi cet argument. So it A l'événement: l'Apocalypse se produira avant l'an 2150; et B l'événement: l'Apocalypse ne se produira pas avant 2150. Soit également Z l'événement: j'ai connu les années 1990. On peut par ailleurs estimer à 40 milliards le nombre d'humains ayant existé depuis la naissance de l'humanité, jusqu'à notre époque: soit H1996 un tel nombre. On peut ainsi admettre, de manière raisonnable, (...) qu'un humain sur dix, dans le cas de l'événement A, aura connu les années 1990; on admettra de même qu'un humain sur 1000 aura connu les années 1990, dans le cas de l'événement B. Si l'on considère maintenant, que la probabilité de A est de 0,01 alors que la probabilité de l'événement B est de 0,99, on peut poser la question: qu'est-ce qui rend plus probable que je sois ici en 1996? (shrink)

I describe several applications of the theory of n-universes through several different probabilistic situations. I describe fi rst how n-universes can be used as an extension of the probability spaces used in probability theory. The extended probability spaces thus defined allow for a finer modeling of complex probabilistic situations and fi ts more intuitively with our intuitions related to our physical universe. I illustrate then the use of n-universes as a methodological tool, with two thought experiments described by John Leslie. (...) Lastly, I model Goodman’s paradox in the framework of n-universes while also showing how these latter appear finally very close to goodmanian worlds. (shrink)

This paper presents a dichotomic analysis of the surprise examination paradox. In section 1, I analyse the surprise notion in detail. I introduce then in section 2, the distinction between a monist and dichotomic analysis of the paradox. I also present there a dichotomy leading to distinguish two basically and structurally different versions of the paradox, respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint definition of the surprise. In section 3, I describe the solution to SEP corresponding to the conjoint (...) definition. Lastly, I expose in section 4, the solution to SEP based on the disjoint definition. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel objection to ontological arguments. This objection aims at showing that ontological arguments in general, given the intrinsic nature of their conclusion, are of an impossible nature. The argument rests on the fact that conclusive ontological arguments would contradict the very nature of God.

I begin by highlighting the importance of the step size in the induction step of the sorites paradox. A careful analysis reveals that the step size can be characterised as a proper instance of the concept very small . After having accurately described the structure of sorites-susceptible predicates, I argue that the structure of the induction step in the Sorites Paradox is inherently circular. This circularity emerges in the structure of Wang's paradox and also of the classical variations of the (...) paradox with the young, bald, etc. predicates. (shrink)

I present a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual emerald case and describe then a set of relevant urn analogies and situations. These latter experiments make it easier to diagnose the flaw in the thirder's line of reasoning. I discuss in detail the root cause of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 which is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. Lastly, I discuss an informative variant of the original Sleeping Beauty experiment that casts (...) light on the diagnosis of the fallacy in the argument for 1/3. (shrink)

Le philosophe mit le pied sur la première marche du IXWXURWURQ. C'était la première fois qu'il utilisait cet appareil pour ses recherches. Bien qu'il vienne seulement d'être mis au point et qu'il ne soit encore qu'à l'état de prototype, ce futurotron pouvait décidément rendre de grands services. De nombreux chercheurs de différentes disciplines l'avaient d'ailleurs déjà utilisé de manière très fructueuse.

I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I point out that such disanalogy is also present within the Emerald case, another thought experiment imagined (...) by John Leslie. I proceed then to build an alternative analogy, which fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument. I draw lastly the consequences of the presence of two alternative analogies on the conclusion of the Simulation Argument. (shrink)

I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist's standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing Bostrom’s Simulation Argument step-by-step. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to several references classes: aware-simulations, rough-simulations and cyborg-type simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending (...) on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature. (shrink)

I present in this paper a solution to the Two-Envelope Paradox. I begin with stating the paradox and describing some related experiments. I justify then the fact that choosing either envelope is indifferent. I also point out the flaw in the reasoning inherent to the two-envelope paradox.

English translation of a paper originally pupblished in French in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy under the title 'Comment l'urne de Carter et Leslie se déverse dans celle de Hempel'. In this paper, I present firstly a solution to Hempel's Problem. I recall secondly the solution to the Doomsday Argument described in my previous Une Solution pour l'Argument de l'Apocalypse (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1998-2) and remark that both solutions are based on a similar line of reasoning. I show thirdly (...) that the Doomsday Argument can be reduced to the core of Hempel's Problem. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a polar concept argument for the existence of abstract objects. After recalling the fundamentals concerning the debate about the existence of abstracta, I present in a detailed way the argument for the existence of abstracta. I offer two different variations of the argument: one, deductive and the other, inductive. The argument rests primarily on the fact that our universe is well-balanced. This well-balanced property results from the fact that all instantiable polar dualities are instantiated. Hence, (...) the abstract pole of the abstract/concrete duality must also be exemplified. Lastly, I review several objections that can be raised against this latter argument. (shrink)

English translation of a paper intially publisdhed in French in Dialogue under the title 'Une solution pour le paradoxe de Goodman'. In the classical version of Goodman's paradox, the universe where the problem takes place is ambiguous. The conditions of induction being accurately described, I define then a framework of n-universes, allowing the distinction, among the criteria of a given n-universe, between constants and variables. Within this framework, I distinguish between two versions of the problem, respectively taking place: (i) in (...) an n-universe the variables of which are colour and time; (ii) in an n-universe the variables of which are colour, time and space. Finally, I show that each of these versions admits a specific resolution. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to describe a conceptual framework for cognitive distortions, which notably allows to specify more accurately their intrinsic relationships. This conceptual framework aims at inserting itself within the apparatus of cognitive therapy and of critical thinking. The present analysis is based on the following fundamental concepts: the reference class, the duality and the system of taxa. With the help of these three notions, each cognitive distortion can be defined. A distinction is also made between, on (...) the one hand, general cognitive distortions and on the other hand, specific cognitive distortions. The present model allows then to define within the same conceptual framework the general cognitive distortions such as dichotomous reasoning, disqualifying a given pole, minimisation and maximisation. It also allows to describe as specific cognitive distortions: disqualifying the positive, selective abstraction and catastrophism. Furthermore, the present model predicts the existence of two other general cognitive distortions: the omission of the neutral and requalifying in the other pole. (shrink)

Classically, in the discussion relating to polar opposites1, one primarily directs his interest to the common and lexicalized concepts, i.e. for which there exists a corresponding word in the vocabulary inherent to a given language. This way of proceeding tends to generate several disadvantages. One of them resides in the fact (i) that such concepts are likely to vary from one language to another, from one culture to another. Another (ii) of the resulting problems is that certain lexicalized concepts reveal (...) a nuance which is either meliorative or pejorative, with degrees in this type of nuances which prove difficult to appreciate. Finally, another problem (iii) lies in the fact that certain concepts, according to semiotic analysis2 are regarded as marked with regard to others concepts which are unmarked, the status of unmarked concept conferring a kind of precedence, of pre-eminence to the concepts in question. (shrink)

Dans ce qui suit, je décrirai un modèle pour la formation et la maintenance des délires polythématiques rencontrés dans la schizophrénie, en adéquation avec le modèle pour les délires décrit par Brendan Maher. Les délires polythématiques y sont considérés comme les conclusions d’arguments déclenchés par l’apophénie et qui comportent des erreurs de raisonnement très communes, telles que le sophisme post hoc et le bais de confirmation. Je décris tout d’abord la structure du raisonnement qui conduit au délire de référence, de (...) télépathie et d’influence, en distinguant entre les arguments délirants de type primaire, secondaire, tertiaire et quaternaire. Ces quatre niveaux d’arguments correspondent respectivement à une phase de nature instancielle, inductive, interprétative au niveau monothématique et, enfin, interprétative au niveau polythématique. Je m’attache ensuite à déterminer de manière précise quelles sont les étapes fallacieuses dans le raisonnement correspondant. J’expose également le rôle de l’apophénie dans l’élaboration des idées délirantes. Enfin, je m’attache à décrire le rôle joué par les hallucinations dans le présent modèle.We proceed to describe a model for the formation and maintenance of polythematic delusions encountered in schizophrenia, which is in adequation with Brendan Maher’s account of delusions. Polythematic delusions are considered here as the conclusions of arguments triggered by apophenia that include some very common errors of reasoning such as post hoc fallacy and confirmation bias. We describe first the structure of reasoning which leads to delusions of reference, of telepathy and of influence, by distinguishing between the primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary types of delusional arguments. These four levels of arguments correspond to a stage the nature of which is repectively instantial, inductive, interpretative at a monothematic level and interpretative at a polythematic level. We also proceed to identify accurately the fallacious steps in the corresponding reasoning. We expose then the role of apophenia in the elaboration of delusional ideas. Lastly, we describe the role played by the hallucinations in the present model. (shrink)

I describe several applications of the theory of n-universes through several different probabilistic situations. I describe fi rst how n-universes can be used as an extension of the probability spaces used in probability theory. The extended probability spaces thus defined allow for a finer modeling of complex probabilistic situations and fi ts more intuitively with our intuitions related to our physical universe. I illustrate then the use of n-universes as a methodological tool, with two thought experiments described by John Leslie. (...) Lastly, I model Goodman’s paradox in the framework of n-universes while also showing how these latter appear finally very close to goodmanian worlds. (shrink)

Attribué à Brandon Carter, l'argument de l'Apocalypse a été décrit par John Leslie. On peut formuler ainsi cet argument. So it A l'événement: l'Apocalypse se produira avant l'an 2150; et B l'événement: l'Apocalypse ne se produira pas avant 2150. Soit également Z l'événement: j'ai connu les années 1990. On peut par ailleurs estimer à 40 milliards le nombre d'humains ayant existé depuis la naissance de l'humanité, jusqu'à notre époque: soit H1996 un tel nombre. On peut ainsi admettre, de manière raisonnable, (...) qu'un humain sur dix, dans le cas de l'événement A, aura connu les années 1990; on admettra de même qu'un humain sur 1000 aura connu les années 1990, dans le cas de l'événement B. Si l'on considère maintenant, que la probabilité de A est de 0,01 alors que la probabilité de l'événement B est de 0,99, on peut poser la question: qu'est-ce qui rend plus probable que je sois ici en 1996? (shrink)

Paul Franceschi | : Je présente dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation selon le point de vue du contextualisme dialectique, fondée sur le problème de la classe de référence. Je décris tout d’abord l’argument de la Simulation de manière détaillée. J’identifie ensuite la classe de référence et j’applique successivement l’argument à trois classes de référence distinctes : les simulations conscientes de leur propre nature de simulation, les simulations imparfaites et les simulations à immersion. Finalement, je montre (...) qu’il existe trois niveaux de conclusion dans l’argument de la Simulation, selon la classe de référence choisie, qui engendrent des conclusions finales d’une nature très différente. | : I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation argument from a dialectical contextualist standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing in detail Bostrom’s Simulation Argument. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to three different reference classes : aware-simulations, imperfect simulations and immersion-simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature. (shrink)

In Franceschi (2002), I exposed a theory which aims to constitute an alternative to the classification proposed by Greimas in the field of paradigmatic analysis. In the present article, I proceed to draw the consequences of this latter theory by applying it to the technique of conception of a plan. Regarding the dialectic plan, the current paradigm is in effect a plan of the type..

L’ouvrage de Max Kistler Causalité et lois de la nature fait suite à la thèse de doctorat de l’auteur et à une série d’articles. Il est à noter qu’une traduction anglaise de Causalité et lois de la nature, à paraître chez Routledge dans la collection «Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy», est également en préparation. Kistler développe dans cet ouvrage une théorie originale de la causalité, qu’il défend de manière élaborée en répondant à un certain nombre d’objections et en montrant également (...) comment sa théorie permet de résoudre un certain nombre de difficultés présentées par d’autres théories causales concurrentes. (shrink)