Arresting Time's Arrow: Death, Loss, and the Preservation of Real Union

In Bennett Gilbert & Natan Elgabsi (eds.), Ethics and Time in the Philosophy of History: A Cross-Cultural Approach. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that the loss of loved ones requires a revised vision of our relationship to past persons. In particular, I argue that relating to deceased loved ones as points on an ordered, forward-moving timeline—on which they grow more distant from us by the moment—has a distorting and damaging effect on our own identity. If we detach ourselves completely from those who sustain important aspects of our identity, this will cause a jagged break in our narrative where a new self must be constructed (whether by us or our circumstances) ex nihilo. On the other hand, if we allow ourselves to drift into the past with the dead—resigning ourselves to existence as an historical object—we will find that we begin to fade away ourselves. Either way, both the self and the beloved are ultimately lost, since both depend on the lost union. To reject both options is a tremendously difficult task that will require rethinking time and our relationship to the past. I argue that we can look to Kierkegaard’s work on maintaining contemporaneity with the historical past, particularly his warnings about how we must not respond to the loss of a beloved. In the last section of the paper, I offer some suggestions for how we might, in a Kierkegaardian spirit, strive to maintain real union with deceased loved ones, thereby rising above the destructive current of time.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Love and privacy.Keith Dromm - 2002 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2):155–167.
The fabrication of memory in communication.Elena Fell - 2011 - Empedocles: European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 2 (2):227-240.
The Ubiquity of Self‐Deception.Rick Fairbanks - 1998 - Philosophical Investigations 21 (1):1–23.
Seeing ourselves as primates.Ronnie Zoe Hawkins - 2002 - Ethics and the Environment 7 (2):60-103.
The Narod, the Intelligentsia, and the Individual.Vitalii Kovalev - 1993 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 31 (4):71-82.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-01-12

Downloads
260 (#81,613)

6 months
93 (#55,573)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Megan Fritts
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references