El yo como fundamento de la identidad desde la fenomenología de la mente de Dan Zahavi

Philosophia: Revista de Filosofía 78 (2):23-43 (2018)
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Abstract

The article has two aims: (a) to show how the notion of self proposed by Zahavi allows to underlie different aspects of personal identity; (b) to provide some elements that strengthen and complement the arguments of the Danish philosopher. First, I begin with a phenomenological analysis of the acts. Second, I study the identity and the various levels of the self that underlie it. Finally, I present some elements to constitute a metaphysics of the human person as a complement to Zahavi’s phenomenology, considering the philosophy of mind as a framework for reflection

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Pablo Emanuel García
Universidad de Montevideo

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