Consensus on What? Convergence for What? Four Models of Political Liberalism

Ethics 128 (1):145-172 (2017)
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Abstract

As we read his work, John Rawls was developing an innovative approach to political philosophy, and Political Liberalism struggles with different ways to model these new insights. This article presents four models of political liberalism, particularly focusing on understanding the nature of overlapping consensus and its relation to public reason. Beyond clarifying Rawls’s insights, we aim to spur readers to reassemble the rich elements of Political Liberalism to produce tractable and enlightening models of political life among free and equal citizens under conditions of deep diversity to advance the public reason project.

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Author Profiles

Chad Van Schoelandt
Tulane University
Gerald Gaus
Last affiliation: University of Arizona

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