On ‘Ravens and Relevance’ and a Likelihood Solution of the Paradox of Confirmation

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (1):75-80 (1969)
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Citations of this work

Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.
The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.

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