Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution

Abstract
According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians. Introduction Hempel's paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption Attempts to defend the disputed assumption Attempts to refute the disputed assumption A way out for Bayesians Conclusion.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/55.3.545
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Citations of this work BETA
A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.
The Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.
Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):207-241.
Does the Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of Confirmation Really Support Bayesianism?Brian Laetz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (1):39-46.
Why Bayesians Needn't Be Afraid of Observing Many Non-Black Non-Ravens.Florian F. Schiller - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):77-88.

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Regarding the Raven Paradox.Robert J. Levy - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:17 - 23.
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