Distributed Cognition as Human Centered although not Human Bound: Reply to Vaesen 1

Social Epistemology 25 (4):393 - 399 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX


At issue is the usefulness of a concept of distributed cognition for the philosophy of science. I have argued for the desirability of regarding scientific systems such as the Hubble Space Telescope as distributed cognitive systems. But I disagree with those who would ascribe cognitive states, such as knowledge, to such systems as a whole, and insist that cognitive states are ascribable only to the human components of such systems. Vaesen, appealing to a well-known ?parity principle,? insists that if there is a distributed cognitive system, it must have cognitive states. Otherwise, we are left with only the cognitive states of individual humans who are then not part of a distributed cognitive system. I argue that Vaesen has misinterpreted the parity principle, which, in any case, I reject, and go on to argue for an understanding of scientific cognition as human centered even though not human bound



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,703

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The role of agency in distributed cognitive systems.Ronald N. Giere - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):710-719.
Scientific cognition: human centered but not human bound.Ronald N. Giere - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):199 - 206.
The Problem of Agency in Scientific Distributed Cognitive Systems.Ronald Giere - 2004 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4):759-774.
Giere's (In)Appropriation of Distributed Cognition.Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Social Epistemology 25 (4):379 - 391.
Distributed cognition without distributed knowing.Ronald N. Giere - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):313-320.
15 Scientific cognition as distributed cognition.Ronald Giere - 2002 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen P. Stich & Michael Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. Cambridge University Press. pp. 285.
The emergence of group cognition.Georg Theiner & Tim O'Connor - 2010 - In A. Corradini & T. O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 6--78.


Added to PP

57 (#248,881)

6 months
1 (#1,017,540)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ronald Giere
Last affiliation: University of Minnesota

Citations of this work

Groups Can Know How.Chris Dragos - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):265-276.
Epistemic autonomy and group knowledge.Chris Dragos - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6259-6279.
Which Groups Have Scientific Knowledge? Wray Vs. Rolin.Chris Dragos - 2016 - Social Epistemology 30 (5-6):611-623.

Add more citations