Emotion as permeative: Attempting to model the unidentifiable

Abstract

The question of emotion in argumentation has received considerable attention in recent years. But there is a tension between the traditional normative role of informal logic, and the inclusion of emotion which is viewed as notoriously unstable. Here I argue that that, a] there is always emotion in an argument; b] that the presence of emotion is a good thing; and c] that we can and ought model and teach the use of emotion in Argumentation Theory.

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2015-04-02

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Michael A. Gilbert
York University

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References found in this work

A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1969 - Harmondsworth,: Penguin Books. Edited by Ernest Campbell Mossner.
Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):151 – 176.
Coalescent argumentation.Michael A. Gilbert - 1995 - Argumentation 9 (5):837-852.

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