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Emotions
Edited by Demian Whiting (University of Hull)
About this topic
| Summary | Philosophers working on the emotions are interested in answering the following kinds of questions: What are emotions? Are they thoughts, feelings, perceptual or quasi-perceptual states, or something else? Or perhaps they are combination of all these things? Do emotions form a natural class? Are emotions natural kinds? Are emotions in some sense ‘socially constructed’? What emotions are there? Is love an emotion? How about Schadenfreude? Are moods emotions? What about so-called moral or aesthetic or religious emotions? Are these emotions proper? Again, how are different emotions to be characterized? What distinguishes them from one another? What is the relationship between emotion and reason? Can emotions be evaluated for their rationality? Or are emotions non-rational mental states? Do we need emotions in order to be ‘rational’? Closely related to the last few questions, what is the nature of the relationship between emotion and morality? Are emotions needed to have insight into the evaluate realm? Can a person who lacks certain emotional capacities be a moral agent? How might emotion be important for understanding character, vice and virtue? How might emotion be a hindrance to morality? Each of the emotion subcategories contains details of work on the emotions that is devoted to answering and shedding light on the above sorts of questions, along with many others. |
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Related
Subcategories
Theories of Emotion (934 | 200)
Varieties of Emotion (1,452 | 916)
Classifying Emotions (101)
Moods (62)
Aesthetics and Emotions* (653)
Emotions and Feelings (178)
Moral Emotion* (979 | 413)
Philosophy of Love* (1,682 | 942)
Jealousy* (82)
Happiness* (1,299)
Anger* (269)
Disgust* (96)
Aspects of Emotion (850 | 157)
Emotions, Misc (1,113 | 1,113)
Music and Emotion* (154)
Sport and Emotion* (6)
Psychopathology and Emotion* (136)
Animal Emotion* (69)
Moral Emotion* (979 | 413)
Animal Emotion* (69)
See also
- Emotion and Consciousness in Psychology (4,214)
- Pain (1,150 | 817)
- Pleasure (1,148 | 24)
History/traditions: Emotions
- Hume: Emotion (57)
- Spinoza: Affects (166)
Contents
8048 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 8048 |
Material to categorize
- On the Temporality of Emotions: An Essay on Grief, Anger, and Love, Berislav Marušić.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2025 - Mind 134 (533):277-284.Berislav Marušić’s On the Temporality of Emotions is a lovely book. Marušić confronts a puzzle about grief and anger that many will find familiar from their own.
- What is an Emotion? An Early Chinese Perspective from the Xing Zi Ming Chu.Wenqing Zhao - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.What is an emotion? Recent studies of cultural psychology suggest that there is no universally shared way of drawing the boundaries around the domain of emotion. In early Chinese philosophy, the abstract category of emotion that superordinates joy, anger, and sadness is sometimes identified with the term qing. This paper extracts, crystallizes, and examines the conception of qing from the excavated “Xing Zi Ming Chu” (XZMC) text, the most important philosophical work on emotion from early China. The paper argues that (...)
- Partial First-Person Authority: How We Know Our Own Emotions.Adam J. Andreotta - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (4):1375-1397.This paper focuses on the self-knowledge of emotions. I first argue that several of the leading theories of self-knowledge, including the transparency method (see, e.g., Byrne 2018) and neo-expressivism (see, e.g., Bar-On 2004), have difficulties explaining how we authoritatively know our own emotions (even though they may plausibly account for sensation, belief, intention, and desire). I next consider Barrett’s (2017a) empirically informed theory of constructed emotion. While I agree with her that we ‘give meaning to [our] present sensations’ (2017a, p.26), (...)
- Does the Emotional Modulation of Visual Experience Entail the Cognitive Penetrability of Early Vision?Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (4):1307-1330.Empirical research suggests that motive states modulate perception affecting perceptual processing either directly, or indirectly through the modulation of spatial attention. The affective modulation of perception occurs at various latencies, some of which fall within late vision, that is, after 150 ms. poststimulus. Earlier effects enhance the C1 and P1 ERP components in early vision, the former enhancement being the result of direct emotive effects on perceptual processing, and the latter being the result of indirect effects of emotional stimuli on (...)
- Why are emotions epistemically indispensable?Fabrice Teroni & Julien Deonna - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):91-113.Contemporary philosophers are attracted by the Indispensability Claim, according to which emotions are indispensable in acquiring knowledge of some important values. The truth of this claim is often thought to depend on that of Emotional Dogmatism, the view that emotions justify evaluative judgements because they (seem to) make us aware of the relevant values. The aim of this paper is to show that the Indispensability Claim does not stand or fall with Emotional Dogmatism and that there is actually an attractive (...)
- Grievance Politics and Identities of Resentment.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.Does it make sense to say that certain evaluative outlooks and political ideologies are essentially negative or oppositional in structure? Intuitively, it seems so: there is a difference between outlooks and ideologies that are expressive of hatred, resentment, and contempt, on the one hand, and those expressive of more affirmative emotions. But drawing this distinction is more difficult than it seems. It requires that we find a way of maintaining the following claim, which I call Negative Orientation: although you claim (...)
- When is Jealousy Appropriate?Arina Pismenny - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (3):333-360.What makes romantic jealousy rational or fitting? Psychologists view jealousy’s function as preserving a relationship against a “threat” from a “rival”. I argue that its more specific aim is to preserve a certain privileged status of the lover in relation to the beloved. Jealousy is apt when the threat to that status is real, otherwise inapt. Aptness assessments of jealousy must determine what counts as a “threat” and as a “rival”. They commonly take for granted monogamous norms. Hence, compared with (...)
- Is there a place for emotions in solutions to the frame problem?Carlos Barth - 2024 - Síntese 51 (161):527-547.The frame problem, a long-standing issue in Artificial Intelligence (AI), revolves around determining the relevance of information in an ever-changing array of contexts, posing a formidable challenge in modeling human reasoning. The purpose of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that emotions are able to solve, or at least enable a substantial step towards a solution. I argue that, while emotions are integral to cognitive processes, they do not offer a solution to the frame problem, nor can they play (...)
- A percepção afetiva de affordances.E. M. Carvalho - 2024 - Síntese Revista de Filosofia 51 (161):413-435.Rob Withagen has rendered the distinction between affordances and invitations more radical in two aspects: (i) affordances do not explain behavior anymore, invitations do; (ii) invitations do not boil down to affectively charged affordances, they also encompass affectively charged misperceptions. I argue that Withagen went too far. If we understand affordances as a relation between the abilities of an individual organism and its environment, then we already have sufficient resources to incorporate affectivity in the ecological approach. Affective states constitute perceptual (...)
- Yearning for the Irretrievable: Nostalgia and Time.Saulius Geniusas - forthcoming - Emotion Review.Situating phenomenological reflections on nostalgia within a historical context, I argue that Kant's temporalization of nostalgia remains incomplete. Bringing into question the widespread assumption that the object of nostalgia must be the past, I argue that nostalgia can be spoken of in three fundamental ways: as nostalgia for the past, for the present, and for the future. I further clarify the relation between the three forms of nostalgia here distinguished, and some other nostalgia that have been addressed in the literature. (...)
- The Cartesian Shift: Redefining Passions from Medieval to Contemporary Perspectives.A. Filipovic & Aleksandar Drašković - forthcoming - Belgrade Philosophical Annual.Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - No reason to focus on emotional episodes.Rodrigo Díaz - forthcoming - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum.Christine Tappolet’s book Philosophy of Emotion: A contemporary introduction, and many other works in emotion theory, focus primarily on emotional episodes at the expense of so-called “emotional dispositions.” I argue that there are no reasons for theories of emotion to focus on emotional episodes, or to reserve the term “emotion” for emotional episodes.
- Grant Bollmer, The Affect Lab: The History and Limits of Measuring Emotion Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2023. Pp. 290. ISBN 978-1-5179-1546-9. $28.00 (paperback). [REVIEW]Riana Betzler - 2024 - British Journal for the History of Science 57 (2):295-297.
- Approval, reflective emotions, and virtue: sentimentalist elements in Husserl’s philosophy.Emanuela Carta - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 32 (6):1329-1349.In this paper, I focus on Edmund Husserl’s analyses of the act of approval and the role he attributes to it in his ethics. I show that we can deepen our understanding of both if we rely on his critical reflections on Shaftesbury’s theory of affections in his lecture course Einleitung in die Ethik. The sections of this course devoted to Shaftesbury are the only place in Husserl’s later philosophical production where he addresses the need to clarify the nature of (...)
- Fear as a Reactive Attitude.Robert Pál-Wallin - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin (ed.), The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. Bloomsbury.In the wake of Peter Frederick Strawson’s landmark essay Freedom and Resentment (1962), much of the theorizing about moral responsibility has centered around the reactive attitudes – with a particular emphasis on guilt, resentment, and indignation. Although philosophical interest in previously unexamined reactive attitudes has grown rapidly in recent years, remarkably little has hitherto been said about fear as a candidate reactive attitude. The aim of this chapter is to explore the phenomenon of fearing other human agents qua agents. Drawing (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Teasing Apart the Roles of Interoception, Emotion, and Self-Control in Anorexia Nervosa.Sarah Arnaud, Jacqueline Sullivan, Amy MacKinnon & Lindsay P. Bodell - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (3):723-747.Anorexia Nervosa (AN) is widely considered to be a bodily disorder accompanied by unrealistic perceptions about one’s own body. Some researchers thus have wondered whether deficits in interoception, a conscious or non-conscious sense of one’s own body, could be a primary cause of AN. In this paper, we make the case that rather than interoception being a primary cause, deficits in interoception may occur as by-products of emotions that arise upstream in the pathogenesis of AN and interact with feelings of (...)
- Empathy through Listening.Seisuke Hayakawa & Katsunori Miyahara - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-16.[The two authors contributed equally to this work.] We often seek empathy from others by asking them to listen to our stories. But what exactly is the role of listening in empathy? One might think that it is merely a means for the empathizer to gather rich information about the empathized. We shall rather argue that listening is an embodied action, one that plays a significant role in empathic perspective-taking. We make our case via a descriptive analysis of a paradigm (...)
- Stigma and Rawlsian Liberalism.Euan Allison - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.Rawlsian liberals face the challenge of providing reasons to oppose stigma that do not appeal to a rejection of controversial stigmatic attitudes, but rather to political values that are undermined by stigma. One prominent strategy (the Self-Respect Strategy) appeals to the threat stigma poses to self-respect. Another strategy (the Hierarchy Strategy) appeals to the dependence of stigmas on social hierarchies, which are taken to be intrinsically problematic. I argue that the Self-Respect Strategy needs further resources in order to answer important (...)
- Affective Injustice and Moral Responsibility.Katherine Villa - 2024 - Dissertation, University of MiamiThis dissertation contributes to feminist critiques of moral responsibility by exposing cases where asymmetries of blame perpetuate oppression by diminishing or disabling the moral agency of individuals from traditionally subordinated social groups. It also engages the recent literature on “affective injustice,” briefly defined as a wrong done to someone at the level of their emotional life. In the first chapter, I connect feminist critiques of moral responsibility with the concept of affective injustice by arguing that the moral wrong that lies (...)
- (1 other version)Interpersonal Hope and Loving Attention.Catherine Rioux - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.Imagine that your lover or close friend has embraced a difficult long-term goal, such as advancing environmental justice, breaking a bad habit, or striving to become a better person. Which stance should you adopt toward their prospects for success? Does supporting our significant others in the pursuit of valuable goals require ignoring part of our evidence? I argue that we have special reasons – reasons grounded in friendship – to hope that our loved ones succeed in their difficult goals. I (...)
- Emotional Cues and Misplaced Trust in Artificial Agents.Joseph Masotti - forthcoming - In Henry Shevlin (ed.), AI in Society: Relationships (Oxford Intersections). Oxford University Press.This paper argues that the emotional cues exhibited by AI systems designed for social interaction may lead human users to hold misplaced trust in such AI systems, and this poses a substantial problem for human-AI relationships. It begins by discussing the communicative role of certain emotions relevant to perceived trustworthiness. Since displaying such emotions is a reliable indicator of trustworthiness in humans, we use such emotions to assess agents’ trustworthiness according to certain generalizations of folk psychology. Our tendency to engage (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Why Delight in Screamed Vocals? Emotional Hardcore and the Case Against Beautifying Pain.Sean T. Murphy - 2024 - British Journal of Aesthetics 64 (4):625-646.Emotional hardcore and other music genres featuring screamed vocals are puzzling for the appreciator. The typical fan attaches appreciative value to musical screams of emotional pain, all the while acknowledging it would be inappropriate to hold similar attitudes towards their sonically similar everyday counterpart: actual human screaming. Call this the screamed vocals problem. To solve the problem, I argue we must attend to the anti-sublimating aims that get expressed in the emotional hardcore vocalist’s choice to scream the lyrics. Screamed vocals (...)
- Emotions and the phenomenal grasping of epistemic blameworthiness.Tricia Magalotti - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):114-131.In this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a special way. Further, I argue that if we generally lack blaming emotions in the epistemic domain, then we are (...)
- Unfair Emotions: Their Morality and Blameworthiness.Jonas Blatter - forthcoming - New York: Routledge.Emotions are an integral part of our moral practices. While the links between emotions and morality have received much philosophical attention recently, the phenomenon of unfair emotions remains under-explored. This book examines an everyday phenomenon: that we often perceive other people’s emotions as unfair, in a similar way as if they acted unfairly. It argues that the notion of unfairness combines elements of the unfittingness and of the moral relevance of an emotion. In the first half of the book, the (...)
- Three Kinds of Argument of the Perception Theory of Emotions and Its Drawbacks.Yu Zhang - forthcoming - Wuda Philosophical Review.The perception theory of emotions mainly argues for the similarity between emotions and perception from different perspectives, including the argument for non-inferential structure, which proposes that emotions and perception share non-inferential structure and non-conceptual content; the argument from the epistemic role, which advocates for the similarity between emotions and perception from an epistemic perspective; and the argument from phenomenology, which argues for the similarity between emotions and perception from a phenomenal perspective. However, these arguments all have some problems. In the (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion and Its Drawbacks.Yu Zhang - 2024 - Foreign Philosophy 47:261-283.The Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion mainly suggest that emotions can be reduced to evaluative beliefs or judgments. Specifically, evaluative beliefs are necessary but not sufficient conditions for evaluative judgments. And reducing emotions to evaluative judgments requires the subject’s conceptualizing ability. However, the Evaluative Judgment Theories of Emotion has many problems, including that evaluative beliefs are neither sufficient nor necessary for emotions; the evaluative judgment theory of emotion presupposes the subject’s conceptual content, but conceptual content is not a necessary and (...)
- Some Emotions Play a Reasonable Role in Akratic Actions, Not a Rational Role.Yu Zhang - 2021 - Paris: Atlantis Press 575:10-14.According to Donald Davidson, an akratic action is opposed to the agent’s better judgment if the agent act freely and intentionally. Davidson says akratic actions are possible and all akratic actions are irrational. However, although akratic actions are possible, akratic actions could be rational. The reasons are that some of these actions are rational; these rational akratic actions are caused by some emotions sometimes, while some emotions cannot make akratic actions rational, including excessive negative emotions, recalcitrant emotions, etc. Therefore, it (...)
- Comment: Debating Empathy: Historical Awareness and Conceptual Precision.Dan Zahavi - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (3):187-189.
- Shame and the question of self-respect.Madeleine Shield - 2024 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 50 (5):721-741.Despite signifying a negative self-appraisal, shame has traditionally been thought by philosophers to entail the presence of self-respect in the individual. On this account, shame is occasioned by one’s failure to live up to certain self-standards—in displaying less worth than one thought one had—and this moves one to hide or otherwise inhibit oneself in an effort to protect one’s self-worth. In this paper, I argue against the notion that only self-respecting individuals can experience shame. Contrary to the idea that shame (...)
- Insurgent subjectivity: Hope and its interactant emotions in the Nicaraguan revolution.Jean-Pierre Reed - 2023 - Theory and Society 52 (3):387-421.This article examines the role of emotions during insurgent conditions by focusing on the Nicaraguan revolution, in particular the two-year period (1977–1979) leading to the overthrow of the Somoza regime. Based on an analysis of testimonial accounts from an oral history volume, ¡Y Se Armó La Runga!, and a NVivo-10 content analysis of testimonies therein, it sets out to make a case for the significance of hope as a dominant emotion during guerrilla offensives. The manuscript answers the following questions: 1) (...)
- Fear, Pathology, and Feelings of Agency: Lessons from Ecological Fear.Charlie Kurth & Panu Pihkala - forthcoming - In Ami Harbin (ed.), The Philosophy of Fear: Historical and Interdisciplinary Approaches. Bloomsbury.This essay examines the connection between fear and the psychopathologies it can bring, looking in particular at the fears that individuals experience in the face of the climate crisis and environmental degradation more generally. We know that fear can be a source of good and ill. Fears of climate-change-driven heat waves, for instance, can spur both activism and denial. But as of yet, we don’t have a very good understanding of why eco-fears, as we will call them, shape our thoughts (...)
- Does perceived parental emotional warmth contribute to adults’ higher compassion? The mediating role of moral identity.Alexandra Maftei & Camelia Alexandra Burdea - 2024 - Ethics and Behavior 34 (7):506-521.Previous studies suggested that parenting is critically important in the development of both moral identity and compassion, but more research is needed concerning the stability of these effects and whether they carry over into adulthood. The present study addressed this issue by examining the link between a specific dimension of perceived parental style and compassion and the mediating role of moral identity in this relationship. The research sample comprised 208 adults aged 18 to 60 (M = 25.44, SD = 7.09, (...)
- Memory and Trauma. Philosophical Perspectives.Marina Trakas, de Avila Nathalia & Emily Walsh (eds.) - 2024 - Valparaíso, Chile: Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso.Michelle Maiese: Trauma, dissociation, and relational authenticity; Caroline Christoff: Performative trauma narratives: Imperfect memories and epistemic harms; Aisha Qadoos: Ambiguous loss: A loved one's trauma; Alberto Guerrero Velázquez: El trauma está en la respuesta. Hacia una visión post-causal en la definición de trauma psicológico; Clarita Bonamino, Sophie Boudrias, and Melanie Rosen: Dreams, trauma, and prediction errors; Gabriel Corda: Memoria episódica y trastorno de estrés postraumático en animales no humanos: una propuesta metodológica; María López Ríos, Christopher Jude McCarroll, and Paloma Muñoz (...)
- Memoria y emoción.Marina Trakas (ed.) - 2021 - La Plata, Argentina: Revista de Psicología UNLP.Verónica Adriana Ramírez, Eliana Ruetti: Memoria emocional en niñas y niños preescolares de diferentes condiciones socio-ambientales; Anne-Lise Saive: Reír para recordar: mejora de la memoria en relación con el humor; Veronika Diaz Abrahan, Maria Benitez, Leticia Sarli, Maximiliano Bossio, Nadia Justel: Memoria emocional. Una revisión sistemática sobre la capacidad modulatoria de la música, la actividad física y el bilingüismo; Matías Bonilla, Camila Isabel Jorge, Malen Daiana Moyano, Cecilia Forcato: Modificación de memorias maladaptativas durante el sueño y la vigilia: una visión (...)
- Emotion in motion: perceiving fear in the behaviour of individuals from minimal motion capture displays.Matthew T. Crawford, Christopher Maymon, Nicola L. Miles, Katie Blackburne, Michael Tooley & Gina M. Grimshaw - 2024 - Cognition and Emotion 38 (4):451-462.The ability to quickly and accurately recognise emotional states is adaptive for numerous social functions. Although body movements are a potentially crucial cue for inferring emotions, few studies have studied the perception of body movements made in naturalistic emotional states. The current research focuses on the use of body movement information in the perception of fear expressed by targets in a virtual heights paradigm. Across three studies, participants made judgments about the emotional states of others based on motion-capture body movement (...)
- Blurring the moral limits of data markets: biometrics, emotion and data dividends.Vian Bakir, Alexander Laffer & Andrew McStay - 2024 - AI and Society 39 (5):2569-2583.This paper considers what liberal philosopher Michael Sandel coins the ‘moral limits of markets’ in relation to the idea of paying people for data about their biometrics and emotions. With Sandel arguing that certain aspects of human life (such as our bodies and body parts) should be beyond monetisation and exchange, others argue that emerging technologies such as Personal Information Management Systems can enable a fairer, paid, data exchange between the individual and the organisation, even regarding highly personal data about (...)
- Willingness of sharing facial data for emotion recognition: a case study in the insurance market.Giulio Mangano, Andrea Ferrari, Carlo Rafele, Enrico Vezzetti & Federica Marcolin - 2024 - AI and Society 39 (5):2373-2384.The research on technologies and methodologies for (accurate, real-time, spontaneous, three-dimensional…) facial expression recognition is ongoing and has been fostered in the past decades by advances in classification algorithms like deep learning, which makes them part of the Artificial Intelligence literature. Still, despite its upcoming application to contexts such as human–computer interaction, product and service design, and marketing, only a few literature studies have investigated the willingness of end users to share their facial data with the purpose of detecting emotions. (...)
- Engaging Emotional Fundamentalism in the University Classroom: Pedagogical and Ethical Dilemmas.Michalinos Zembylas - 2024 - British Journal of Educational Studies 72 (4):483-500.The aim of this paper is to turn attention to the role of affects and emotions in fundamentalism, and examine two interrelated dilemmas that emerge when university instructors come across students who express fundamentalist beliefs and emotions in the classroom: pedagogical and ethical dilemmas. The paper examines these dilemmas through the analysis of an incident in which the author engaged with a student holding religious fundamentalist beliefs. The analysis brings two significant bodies of literature together – the literature on fundamentalism (...)
- What is the role of affective forecasting in knowing what we value?Diana Craciun - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology:1–23.Generally, we confidently ascribe valuing states to ourselves. We make statements such as “I value democracy” or “I value my best friend” - our sense of who we are depends on doing so. Yet what justifies that confidence? If you were asked “Do you value philosophy, or are you just doing it for the money?”, how might you go about generating such knowledge? I will operate with the notion that valuing involves, at a minimum, a set of distinctive emotional dispositions (...)
- Emotions, norms, and consequences as the forces of good and evil: An investigation on sales professionals.Mücahid Yıldırım & Şuayıp Özdemir - 2024 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 33 (4):828-846.Traditionally, the consequences of employees' behavior (teleology) and the norms attributed to the behavior (deontology) have been two familiar determinants of ethical decision making (EDM). More recently, emotions have also gained considerable attention for their ability to affect EDM. Marketing ethics literature overlooks how emotions are related with norms and consequences. Hence, this study investigates how normative, consequentialist, and emotional factors interactively influence EDM in a sales ethics context. Using scenarios with a 2 × 2 between-groups factorial design, we collected (...)
- (1 other version)Emotional unreliability and epistemic defeat.Tricia Magalotti - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.Among those who think that emotions can provide epistemic reasons for belief, there is disagreement about whether emotions provide foundational reasons (ones that are not based on further reasons) or non-foundational reasons (ones that are based on further reasons). I argue in this paper that considerations about evidence of emotional unreliability favour the non-foundational view of emotional reasons. The argument starts with a set of counterexamples to the claim that evidence of emotional unreliability always defeats emotional justification. I then show (...)
- Shared emotion without togetherness: the case of shared grief.Louise Richardson - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-22.I offer a philosophical account of shared grief, on which it is a process, undergone by a group, of recognising and accommodating significant possibilities that are lost to that group. In setting out from an understanding of grief’s distinctive characteristics, a philosophically interesting, metaphysically undemanding, and practically useful account of shared grief comes into view, that has broader consequences for understanding shared emotion.
- A Puzzle about Empathy.Adina L. Roskies - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):278-280.Is empathy important for moral behavior? To answer this we will have to be conceptually clearer, empirically more detailed, and pay attention to the neural mechanisms underlying empathy-related phenomena.
- Posidonius’ Two Systems: Animals and Emotions in Middle Stoicism.Benjamin Harriman - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (3):455-491.This paper attempts to reconstruct the views of the Stoic Posidonius on the emotions, especially as presented by Galen’s On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. This is a well-studied area, and many views have been developed over the last few decades. It is also significant that the reliability of Galen’s account is openly at issue. Yet it is not clear that the interpretative possibilities have been fully demarcated. Here I develop Galen’s claim that Posidonius accepted a persistent, non-rational aspect (...)
- How anger helps us possess reasons for action.Steven Gubka - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.I argue that anger helps us possess reasons to intervene against others. This is because fitting anger disposes us to intervene against others in light of reasons to do so. I propose that anger is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize such interventions, in much the same way that perceptual experience is a presentation of reasons that seems to rationalize our judgements about our environment. In this way, anger can help us possess reasons that make specific actions rational (...)
- The tempest within: the origins and outcomes of intense national emotions in times of national division.Yuval Feinstein - 2024 - Theory and Society 53 (4):729-763.Theories of intense national emotions have focused on affection for the home nation and antagonism for national others but overlooked antagonism for fellow nationals. The article introduces a comprehensive theory of intense national emotions. It first discusses the sources of the potential energy stored in national identities, pointing to a combination of two factors: the nation is at once potent due to its capacity to shield against existential threats and precarious due to its dependence on the reproduction of contested narratives. (...)
- “You and me, same!”: Political Envy in Do The Right Thing.Logan Canada-Johnson & Sara Protasi - 2025 - Film and Philosophy 29:45-60.In this paper we argue that political envy is central to unraveling the racial dynamics in Spike Lee's Do The Right Thing. Building upon Sara Protasi’s taxonomy of envy and, in particular, from her analysis of some DTRT scenes, we conduct a more thorough interrogation of how political emotions, most notably envy, shape race relations in the film. We start by summarizing Protasi’s account of envy and then review two alternative accounts of political emotions. After elucidating what envy is and (...)
- Recalcitrant emotions: The problems of perceptual theories.Giulio Sacco - 2024 - Ratio 37 (2-3):156-167.The term ‘recalcitrant emotions’ refers to those cases where we feel an emotion that apparently contradicts our better judgements. For instance, one may be afraid of flying while claiming not to believe that it is dangerous. This phenomenon is commonly conceived as an objection to cognitivism, according to which emotions are based on the subject's beliefs, insofar as it would force us to ascribe to the subject who feels them an excessive degree of irrationality, comparing recalcitrant emotions to contradictory beliefs. (...)
- The perceptual model: Emotions as possessed reasons.Hamid Vahid - 2024 - Ratio 37 (2-3):168-177.Emotions play vital roles in our psychology and our lives. They also often form the basis of our evaluative beliefs. On some views, emotions, like perceptions, justify the beliefs to which they give rise. It has, however, been claimed that, unlike perceptions, emotions are merely proxies for the genuine reasons that are constituted by their cognitive bases. In this paper, I argue that this objection arises from the failure to notice the difference between the notions of ‘reasons there are’ and (...)
- On How to Develop Emotion Taxonomies.Raamy Majeed - 2024 - Emotion Review 16 (3):139-150.How should we go about developing emotion taxonomies suitable for a science of emotion? Scientific categories are supposed to be “projectable”: They must support generalizations required for the scientific practices of induction and explanation. Attempts to provide projectable emotion categories typically classify emotions in terms of a limited set of modules, but such taxonomies have had limited uptake because they arguably misrepresent the diversity of our emotional repertoire. However, more inclusive, non-modular, taxonomies also prove problematic, for they struggle to meet (...)
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