La nouvelle casuistique et la naturalisation des normes

Philosophiques 28 (1):87-107 (2001)

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Abstract
Il s'agit de déterminer le statut des normes chez les nouveaux casuistes . On indique d'abord quelles sont les circonstances de cette nouvelle casuistique ; on suggère ensuite qu'elle exporte dans le domaine de l'éthique certaines thèses de T. Kuhn, comme le « modèle déductiviste », qu'elle prétend détrôner, s'alimentait au schéma Hempel-Oppenheim de l'explication scientifique. On suggère enfin que les nouveaux casuistes procèdent, de façon plus ou moins radicale, à une naturalisation des normes.It is intented to investigate about the status of norms in the thought of the new casuists . First, the circumstances of the new casuistry are set out; then it is suggested that the new casuists have integrated in their argument concepts from T. Kuhn, just as the “deductivist model” they so sharply criticize integrates concepts from C.G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim. With regard to the initial question, it is shown that the new casuists uphold a kind of norms-naturalizing constructivism
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DOI 10.7202/004929ar
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Philosophy of Science 15 (2):135-175.
Studies in the Logic of Explanation.Carl G. Hempel & Paul Oppenheim - 1948 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):133-133.

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