Cognitive pleasure and distress

Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23 (1981)
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Abstract

Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".

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Irwin Goldstein
Davidson College

Citations of this work

Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intrinsicalism and conditionalism about final value.Jonas Olson - 2004 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (1):31-52.

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