Cognitive pleasure and distress

Philosophical Studies 39 (January):15-23 (1981)
Abstract
Explaining the "intentional object" some people assign pleasure, I argue that a person is pleased about something when his thoughts about that thing cause him to feel pleasure. Bernard Williams, Gilbert Ryle, and Irving Thalberg, who reject this analysis, are discussed. Being pleased (or distressed) about something is a compound of pleasure (pain) and some thought or belief. Pleasure in itself does not have an "intentional object".
Keywords Belief  Cause  Cognition  Epistemology  Pleasure
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DOI 10.1007/BF00354809
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