Theories of Emotion, Misc

The question about evolution of consciousness has been addressed so far as possible selectional advantage related to consciousness ("What evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism ? "). But evidencing an adaptative explanation of consciousness has proven to be very difficult. Reason for that being the complexity of consciousness. We take here a different approach on subject by looking at possible selectional advantages related to the performance of Self Awareness that appeared during evolution millions of years (...) before consciousness as we know it for humans. The interest of such an approach is that the analysis of selectional advantage is done at an evolution step sigificantly simpler that the step of Human Consciousness. We analyse how evolutionary advantages have resulted from this specific Self Awareness step. This is done by taking into consideration the possibility for a subject to identify with a conspecific at this level of evolution. We use the results made available by Mirror Neuron researchs where intersubjectivity and some level of identification with conspecifics have been evidenced for non human primates. Selectional advantages related to Self Awareness are analysed two ways: - Reformulating the performances of imitation and of development of language. - Showing that Self Awareness within group life can naturaly produce an important increase in fear/anxiety for a subject, and that the means implemented by the subject to overcome this fear/anxiety can act as significant evolution advantages opening the road to Human Consciousness. Such approach brings new elements supporting the view that consciousness is grounded in emotions. It also proposes some more evolutionist explanations to the widely dicussed subject of Empathy (S. Preston & F. de Waal) in terms of specific behaviour implemented to limit fear/anxiety increase. This approach also provides some explanation for limited anxiety within dolphins and introduces a basis for a possible phylogenesis of emotions. (shrink)

There are alternative models, which are based on the evaluation of certain properties, based on physiology or evolutionary psychology. Classical philosophers have addressed emotions as responses to certain types of events that are related to a subject, causing bodily and behavioral changes. In the last century emotions were neglected, being considered a disturbing factor. Lately, emotions have returned to the attention of philosophers and psychologists, corroborating them with other disciplines such as psychology, neurology, evolutionary biology and even economics. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28869.06881 (...) . (shrink)

Înțelepciunea în hinduism consideră cunoașterea de sine ca fiind adevărul, baza întregii Creații, a lui Shristi. Ar rezulta că înțeleaptă este o persoană cu conștiința de sine martoră a întregii creații în toate fațetele și formele sale. Nu există multe studii referitor la inteligența emoțională din perspectiva indiană, deși inteligența emoțională se regăsește în fiecare text din literatura antică indiană. Tradiția filosofică indiană pune accent pe natura puternică a emoțiilor, care trebuie valorificate pentru o viață armonioasă. Patanjali, „părintele psihologiei indiene”, (...) a studiat mintea umană cu mii de ani înaintea filosofilor occidentali. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.25425.89443. (shrink)

Emoția poate fi diferită de alte constructe similare, precum sentimentele (nu toate sentimentele includ emoția); stările sufletești (durează mult mai mult decât emoțiile, sunt mai puțin intense și adesea lipsite de stimul contextual), sau afectul (experiența sentimentului sau a emoției). Platon, în Republica, propune trei componente de bază ale minții umane: raționamentul, dorința și părțile emotive. Pentru Aristotel emoțiile au fost importante în viața morală, o componentă esențială a virtuții. Stoicii au evidențiat importanța emoțiilor în judecată (în teoriile stoice, emoțiile (...) sunt considerate o piedică pentru rațiune, și deci pentru virtute). DOI 10.13140/RG.2.2.24223.30884. (shrink)

Modelele inteligenței emoționale au ajutat la dezvoltarea de diferite instrumente pentru evaluarea constructelor. Fiecare paradigmă teoretică conceptualizează inteligența emoțională din una din cele două perspective: abilitatea sau modelul mixt. Modelele de abilitate consideră inteligența emoțională ca o formă pură a abilității mentale și deci ca o inteligență pură. Modelele mixte de inteligență emoțională combină capacitatea mentală cu caracteristicile personalității. Modelele de trăsături ale inteligenței emoționale se referă la percepțiile individuale ale abilităților emoționale proprii. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32497.22881 .

Emoția este combinația dintre un proces de evaluare mentală și răspunsuri la acest proces. Dar nu toate emoțiile generează sentimente, și nu toate sentimentele își au originea în emoții. Emoția și sentimentul se bazează astfel pe două procese de bază, vizualizarea unei anumite stări corporale juxtapuse la colectarea semnalelor de declanșare și de stimulare a mușchilor, și un proces cognitiv care însoțește evenimentele respective dar care funcționează în paralel. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.21890.22723.

While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions and about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect (...) that cognitive encapsulation marks the distinction between basic and higher cognitive emotions. Finally, I draw out the implications of these claims for debates about the existence of basic emotions in humans. (shrink)

In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.

Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra the rationalist criticisms of May 2018, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.

This monograph introduces a meta-framework for conducting interdisciplinary research in the science of emotion, as well as a framework for a particular kind of theory of emotion. It can also be understood as a “cross-over” book that introduces neophytes to some of the current discourse and major challenges for an interdisciplinary approach to the science of emotion, especially from a philosophical perspective. It also engages experts from across the disciplines who are interested in conducting an interdisciplinary approach to research and (...) theorizing in the science of emotion, and introduces to them some of the contemporary debates in the philosophy of emotion. It does so by providing a taxonomy of theories of emotion which allows one to understand the contemporary interdisciplinary discourse in the science of emotion as a debate between four fundamental types of theories of emotion—realism, instrumentalism, eliminative-realism, and eliminativism—and which can be found or potentially found across the disciplines, and by arguing for foundational principles which can unify, without consilience, these four kinds of approaches as perspectives about the same object of inquiry. It also covers a wide range of concerns, including the problem of skepticism in the science of emotion, the problem of the underdetermination of a theory by the evidence, the question of the place of ordinary intuitions and ordinary language for a science of emotion, the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, the meta-hard problem of consciousness, the problem of intentionality, questions about the rationality of emotions and whether emotions can be a vehicle for knowledge, and the debate between cognitive and noncognitive theories in the philosophy of emotion. (shrink)

Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...) to be built into mind-independent moral reality. One alternative, however, is that the to-be-pursuedness is built into our faculty of moral sensibility. There is a large body of empirical evidence demonstrating that the emotions play a central role in making moral judgments. I shall argue that this helps to explain how normative judgments are reliably and non-accidentally related to motivation. I shall also argue that emotional experience has the right structure and properties to provide us with a defeasible warrant for normative knowledge. The role of the emotions in our moral psychology does not obviously support anti-realism. Rather, emotional experience can be intentional, evaluative, evaluable, and quasi-perceptual. This makes emotional experience a plausible candidate for constituting a non-queer faculty of moral sensibility. (shrink)

According to the perceptual theory of emotions, emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties. The account has recently faced a barrage of criticism recently by critics who point out varies disanalogies between emotion and paradigmatic perceptual experiences. What many theorists fail to note however, is that many of the disanalogies that have been raised to exclude emotions from being perceptual states that represent evaluative properties have also been used to exclude high-level properties from appearing in the content of perception. This suggests (...) that (1) emotions are perceptions of high-level properties and (2) perceptual theorists can marshal the arguments used by proponents of high-level perception to defend the perceptual theory. This paper therefore defends an account of emotion as high-level perception. (shrink)

It seems natural to think that emotional experiences associated with a memory of a past event are new and present emotional states triggered by the remembered event. This common conception has nonetheless been challenged at the beginning of the 20th century by intellectuals who considered that emotions can be encoded and retrieved, and that emotional aspects linked to memories of the personal past need not necessary to be new emotional responses caused by the act of recollection. They called this specific (...) kind of memories “affective memories” and defended their existence. My aim here is to expound the historical background of this debate as well as the characterization and development of the notion of affective memory since its first inception. I aim to show that although the debate was left unresolved and the term disappeared from academy around 1930, many of the characterizations of the nature of emotions and memory done by the advocates of affective memory have reappeared in the scientific agenda and been further developed during the last decades. (shrink)

In discussions of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for cognitivists who hold the emotions are judgments or beliefs. But more recently, it has been argued that the very theories that emerged from the failure of cognitivism face trouble as well. One gets the sense that the theory that can accomplish this will win a crucial (...) point over its competitors. In the present paper I offer a new approach to making sense of the normative tension to which recalcitrant emotions give rise. Interestingly, the approach is one that can be adopted by anyone willing to grant that emotions are themselves governed by norms. (shrink)

It is argued that God cannot be a fitting target of prepositional gratitude. The first premise is that if someone cannot be benefited, then they cannot be a fitting target of prepositional gratitude. The second premise is that God cannot be benefited. Concerning the first premise, it is argued that a necessary component of prepositional gratitude is the desire to benefit one’s benefactor. Then it is argued that such a desire is fitting only if one’s benefactor can in fact be (...) benefited. Concerning the second premise, it is noted that classical theism widely attributes blessedness to God. It is argued that if God is blessed then God necessarily has as much well-being as it is possible for God to have, and hence God cannot be benefited. Also noted are some ways in which God’s blessedness is compatible with less orthodox ideas about God’s passibility. The argument is then defended against eight objections. (shrink)

There is a growing consensus that emotions contribute positively to human practical rationality. While arguments that defend this position often appeal to the modularity of emotion-generation mechanisms, these arguments are also susceptible to the criticism, e.g. by Jones (2006), that emotional modularity supports pessimism about the prospects of emotions contributing positively to practical rationality here and now. This paper aims to respond to this criticism by demonstrating how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive influence required to (...) make the pro-emotion position plausible whilst exhibiting key elements of modularity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT LeDoux's pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths’ argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning. LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread. He argues that using emotion terms, like ‘fear’, to describe neurocognitive data adds (...) a ‘surplus meaning’: it attributes phenomenal properties to survival circuits which they don’t possess. This paper aims to explore LeDoux's new proposal, and examine the potentially devastating consequences that ensue for the aforementioned views. I end by addressing the worry that these lessons are conditional on LeDoux's own higher-order theory of emotional consciousness being true. (shrink)

A view inherited from Max Weber states that purposive rational action, value rational action and affective action are three distinct types of social action that can compete, oppose, complement or substitute each other in social explanations. Contrary to this statement, I will defend the view that these do not constitute three different types of social actions, but that social actions always seem to concurrently involve rationality, normativity and affectivity. I show this by discussing the links between rational actions and consequentialism (...) and non-consequentialism, and by elaborating on certain major relationships between rationality, normativity and emotions. (shrink)

It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...) still seems to be considerable potential for exchange and dialogue if the situation is compared with their intimate relationship in central strands of early realist phenomenology. The philosopher perhaps most representative of this ecumenical approach is Husserl’s early student Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). From the very early stages of his philosophical career, Hildebrand has developed one of the most original, comprehensive and nuanced accounts of emotions at whose core is a detailed examination of their connection to value. While his central concern with the ethical significance of our affective life is in many ways continuous with Scheler’s work and draws crucially on Reinach’s philosophy of mind, Hildebrand’s own reflections considerably expand on and substantially modify the picture of the ontology and normative role of emotions defended by these authors. In this article, I reconstruct Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject. (shrink)

Inteligența emoțională este un set de abilități pentru răspunsurile la evenimente care constituie emoții. Prin integrarea inteligenței cu emoția se pot determina „cel puțin unele răspunsuri „corecte” în ceea ce privește sentimentele” pentru a distinge indivizii în funcţie de inteligența emoțională într-un context cultural dat. În prezent, organizațiile trebuie să facă față, pe lângă o concurență sporită, și unei dezvoltări și inovații tehnologice exponențiale, și unor procese de schimbare care afectează toate stările emoționale ale angajaților. Toate aceste provocări, împreună cu (...) schimbările impuse și complexitatea sarcinilor organizaționale și manageriale, implică noi exigențe emoționale și acțiuni mai eficiente la nivel corporativ, inclusiv prin gestionarea emoțiilor în cele mai multe circumstanțe. Astfel, emoțiile reprezintă „resurse” valoroase pentru inovație și valoare adăugată într-un proces economic. Inteligența emoțională a fost un subiect important și controversat în ultimele decenii. Inteligența emoțională este cheia pentru simțire, gândire, învățare, rezolvarea problemelor și luarea deciziilor. ”Oricine se poate supăra - asta este ușor. Dar să fii supărat pe persoana potrivită, într-un grad potrivit, la momentul potrivit, în scopul potrivit și în modul corect - acest lucru nu este ușor.” (Aristotel) CUPRINS: 1. Emoții - Introducere - Etimologie și istorie - Definiții - Componente - Diferenţiere - Scopul și valoarea - Clasificare - - Emoții de bază - - Analiza multidimensională - Teorii - - Istoria pre-modernă - - Teorii evolutive - - - Secolul al 19-lea - - - Contemporan - - Teorii somatice - - - Teoria Cannon-Bard - - - Teoria cu doi factori - - Teorii cognitive - - - Teoria perceptuală - - - Teoria evenimentelor afective - - Perspectiva situată asupra emoției - - Genetica - Cum se formează emoțiile - - Explicație neurobiologică - - - Cortexul prefrontal - - - Emoție homeostatică / primordială - - Explicații emergente - Abordări disciplinare - - Istorie - - Sociologie - - - Psihoterapie și reglare - - Cercetări interculturale - - Informatică - 1.1. Modele ale emoțiilor - 1.2. Procesarea emoțiilor - 1.3. Sentimente - - Sentimentele despre sentimente - - Autoagresiunea - - Sentimentele intestinale - - A ști sau a nu ști - - Munca emoțională - 1.4. Fericirea - - Definiție - - Legătura cu sănătatea fizică - - Filozofie - - Religie - - - Religiile orientale - - - - Budism - - - - Hinduism - - - - Confucianismul - - - Religiile abrahamice - - - - Iudaismul - - - - Catolicismul roman - - - - Islam - - Psihologie - - - Ierarhia nevoilor a lui Maslow - - - Teoria autodeterminării - - - Psihologie pozitivă - - - Măsurarea fericirii - - Viziunea economică și politică 2. Filosofia emoțiilor - 2.1. Filosofia fericirii - - Grecia antică - - - Platon - - - Aristotel - - - Cinism - - - Cirenaicism - - - Pironism - - - Epicureism - - - Stoicism - - Roma antică - - - Școala lui Sextius - - - Augustin de Hippo - - - Boețiu - - Evul Mediu - - - Avicenna - - - Al-Ghazali - - - Maimonide - - - Thomas de Aquino - - Perioada modernă timpurie - - - Michel de Montaigne - - - Jeremy Bentham - - - Arthur Schopenhauer - - Perioada contemporană - - - Władysław Tatarkiewicz - - - Herbert Marcuse - - - Viktor Frankl - - - Robert Nozick - - Scientismul - - Studiul fericirii - 2.2. Filosofia dragostei - - Teorii actuale - - Tradițiile occidentale - - - Rădăcini clasice - - - Petrarhism - - - Scepticismul galician - - Tradițiile orientale - 2.3. Apateia - 2.4. Ataraxia - - Epicureismul - - Pironism - - Stoicism - 2.5. Ānanda - - Diferite sensuri de fericire în filosofia hindusă - - - Swami Vivekananda - - - Sri Aurobindo - - - Advaita vedanta - - - Dvaita vedanta - - - Vishishtadvaita vedanta - - - Sri Ramana Maharshi - - Modalități de realizare a ānandei - 2.6. Emotivism - - Istorie - - Susținători - - - A. J. Ayer - - - C. L. Stevenson - - - - Primul model de analiză - - - - Al doilea model de analiză - - - - Metode de argumentare - 2.7. Etica emoțiilor - 2.8. Behaviorism - - Varietăți - - - Behaviorism radical - - Inovații experimentale și conceptuale - - Relația cu limbajul - - Educaţie - - Condiționarea operantă - - Condiționarea respondentului - - În filozofie - - - Legea efectului și condiționarea urmei - - - Behaviorism molecular versus behaviorism molar - - - Behaviorismul teoretic - - Informatică comportamentală și calcul comportament - - Critici și limitări - 2.9. Funcționalism - - Realizabilitate multiplă - - Tipuri - - - Funcționismul mașină-stare - - - Psiho-funcționalism - - - Funcționalismul analitic - - - Funcționalismul homuncular - - - Funcționalism mecanic - - Fizicalismul - - Critica funcționalismului - - - Creierul Chinei - - - Camera chinezească - - - Spectru inversat - - - Pământul geamăn - - - Holism de semnificație - - - Argumente de trivialitate 3. Inteligența socială - Ipoteză - Măsurare - Diferențe de inteligență - Alte opinii - 3.1. Construcționism social - - Definiție - - Origini - - Aplicații - - - Psihologia constructului personal - - - Psihologie educațională - - - Terapie sistemică - - Istorie și dezvoltare - - - Berger și Luckmann - - - Turnura narativă - - - Postmodernismul - - Critici - 3.2. Constructivism social - - Filozofie - - Psihologie și religie - 3.3. Consecințialism - - Filosofii - - - Consecințialismul de stat - - - Utilitarism - - - Egoismul etic - - - Altruismul etic - - - Consecințialismul regulilor - - - Consecințialismul motivațional - - - Consecințialism negativ - - - Etica teleologică - - - Actele și omisiunile, și "doctrina actelor și omisiunilor" - 3.4. Pragmatism - - Obiectivele de bază - - - Anti-reificarea conceptelor și teoriilor - - - Naturalism și anti-cartezianism - - - Reconcilierea anti-scepticismului și a falibilismului - - - Teoria pragmatistă a adevărului și a epistemologiei - - În alte domenii ale filozofiei - - - Filosofia științei - - - Logică - - - Metafizică - - - Filosofia minții - - - Etică - - - Estetică - - - Filosofia religiei - - Neopragmatism - - Moștenirea și relevanța contemporană - - - Efecte asupra științelor sociale - - - Efecte asupra administrației publice - - - Efecte asupra feminismului - - Critici - 3.5. Utilitarism - - Etimologie - - Fundal istoric - - - Filozofia chineză - - - Filosofia occidentală - - Utilitarismul clasic - - - Jeremy Bentham - - - John Stuart Mill - - - - Plăcerile superioare și inferioare - - - - „Dovada” lui Mill a principiului utilității - - Evoluții din secolul XX - - - Utilitarismul ideal - - - Utilitarismul de acte și de reguli - - - Utilitarismul pe două niveluri - - - Utilitarismul de preferință - - Mai multe tipuri de utilitarism - - - Utilitarismul negativ - - - Utilitarismul de motiv - - Critica utilitarismului - - - Utilitatea cuantificării - - - Utilitatea ignoră justiția - - - Prezicerea consecințelor - - - Obiecție de cerință - - - Agregarea utilității - - - Calcularea utilității eșuează - - - Criticile obligațiilor speciale - - - Critici ale teoriei valorilor utilitariste - - - Critici bazate pe datorie - - Considerații suplimentare - - - Fericirea medie vs. fericirea totală - - - Motive, intenții și acțiuni - - Judecățile morale utilitariste - - - Utilitarismul, deontologia și dilemele morale - - - Judecățile morale utilitariste - 3.6. Teoria (etica) virtuții - - Concepte cheie - - Istoria virtuții - - „Turnura aretaică” contemporană 4. Inteligența emoțională - Istorie - Definiții - Modelul de abilitate - - Măsurare - - Alte măsurători - Model mixt - - Măsurarea - Modelul de trăsătură - - Măsurare - Efecte generale - Critici de fundamentare teoretică - - Nu poate fi recunoscută ca formă de inteligență - - Confuzia abilităților cu calitățile morale - - Are o mică valoare predictivă - Critici de măsurare - - Măsoară conformitatea, nu abilitatea - - Măsoară cunoștințele, nu abilitatea - - Măsoară personalitatea și inteligența generală - - Măsuri de auto-raportare sensibile la fals - - Puterea predicativă nu s-a dovedit - - NICHD caută consensul - Interacțiuni cu alte fenomene - - Bullying - - Leadership - - Sănătate - - Stima de sine și dependența de droguri - 4.1. Definiții și competențe ale inteligenței emoționale - 4.2. Modele ale inteligenței emoționale - - Modelul de abilități al lui Mayer și Salovey - - Modelul mixt al lui Goleman - - Modelul mixt al lui Bar-On - - Modelul de trăsături al lui Petrides - 4.3. Modelul de abilitate al inteligenței emoționale - - Schisma din domeniu - - - Idei inițiale - - - Factori externi - - - Apariția modelelor mixte - - Modelul cu patru ramuri al inteligenței emoționale - - - Introducere generală în domeniul inteligenței emoționale - - - - Emoțiile - - - - Emoțiile ca semnale - - - Inteligența emoțională și modelul cu patru ramuri - - - Măsurarea inteligenței emoționale - - - - Măsurări ale abilităților inteligenței emoționale - - - - Teoria măsurării inteligenței emoționale - - - - Elemente cheie referitoare la inteligența emoțională și alte trăsături psihologice - - Semnificația inteligenței emoționale - - - Considerații generale privind valabilitatea unei măsurări de IE - - - IE și sentimentele de înțelegere - - - IE și simptomele subiective - - - IE și înțelegerea relațiilor sociale - - - Înțelegerea relațiilor de muncă - - - Considerații de valabilitate incrementală - 4.4. Modelul stratificat al inteligenței emoționale - - Constatări ale cercetării - - - Teoriile inteligenței - - - Emoţiile - - - Inteligența emoțională - - Piramida inteligenței emoționale: modelul cu nouă straturi - - - Stimulii emoționali - - - Recunoașterea emoției - - - Conștiința de sine - - - Managementul propriu - - - Conștientizarea socială - Empatie - Discriminarea emoțiilor - - - Abilități sociale - expertiză - - - Actualizarea proprie - Universalitatea emoțiilor - - - Transcendența - - - Unitate emoțională - - Procese cognitive și metacognitive în piramida inteligenței emoționale - - Discuții și concluzii - 4.5. Filosofia inteligenței emoționale - 4.6. Înțelepciunea - - Definiții - - Perspective mitologice și filozofice - - Perspective educaționale - - Perspective psihologice - - - Măsurarea înțelepciunii - - Sapiența - 4.7. Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală - 4.8. Karma yoga 5. Inteligența emoțională în afaceri - 5.1. Lucrul cu emoțiile - - Hochschild - - Exemple - - Critici - 5.2. Munca emoțională - - Determinanți - - Acțiuni de suprafață si profunde - - Implicaţii - - - Adaptarea - - Munca emoțională și inteligența emoțională - 5.3. Neuromarketing - - Istorie - - Concept - - Segmentare și poziționare - - Critica - - - Pseudoştiinţă - - - Invazia confidențialității - - - Manipulare - - Limitări - 5.4. Marketing relațional - - Dezvoltare - - Domeniu - - Abordări - - - Satisfacţia - - - Retenţia - - Aplicare - - - Marketing intern - - - Modelul celor șase piețe - - - Marketing live-in - - - - Istorie - - - - Premisă - 5.5. Comportamentul consumatorilor - - Origini ale comportamentului consumatorului - - Definiție și explicație - - Decizia de cumpărare și contextul acesteia - - Procesul deciziei de cumpărare a consumatorului: o imagine de ansamblu - - - Recunoasterea problemei - - - Evaluarea alternativelor - - - - Comportamentul consumatorilor de marketing - - - Decizia de cumpărare - - - Evaluare post-cumpărare - - Influențe asupra deciziei de cumpărare - - - Conștientizarea consumatorilor - - - Influențe interne asupra deciziei de cumpărare - - - - Motivații și emoții - - - - Percepţie - - - - Experientța anterioară - - - - Cultura - - - - Subculturi - - - - Clasă socială - - - - Grupuri de referință - - Stiluri de decizie a consumatorilor - - Afectare: Emoții, sentimente și dispoziții - - - Căutarea informațiilor - - - Alegerea - - - Experiența clienților - - - Satisfacția clienților - - - Publicitate - 5.6. Inteligența emoțională în cercetare și educație - 5.7. Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații - 5.8. Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații - 5.9. Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații - 5.10. Tendințe Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)

Une argumentation pour l'importance dualiste des émotions dans la société, individuellement et au niveau communautaire. La tendance actuelle à la prise de conscience et au contrôle des émotions grâce à l'intelligence émotionnelle a un effet bénéfique dans les affaires et pour le succès des activités sociales mais, si nous n'y prenons pas garde, elle peut conduire à une aliénation irréversible au niveau individuel et social. L'essai est composé de trois parties principales: Émotions (Modèles d'émotions, Le processus des émotions, La bonheur, (...) La philosophie des émotions, L'éthique des émotions), Intelligence émotionnelle (Modèles d'intelligence émotionnelle, L'intelligence émotionnelle dans la recherche et l'éducation, La philosophie d'intelligence émotionnelle, L'intelligence émotionnelle dans la philosophie orientale) et Intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations (Travail émotionnel, La philosophie de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations, La critique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations, L'éthique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations). Dans les Conclusions, je présente un résumé des déclarations contenues dans le document. SOMMAIRE: Abstract 1. Émotions 1.1 Modèles d'émotion 1.2 Traitement des émotions 1.3 Bonheur 1.4 La philosophie des émotions 1.5 L'éthique des émotions 2. Intelligence émotionnelle 2.1 Modèles d'intelligence émotionnelle 2.1.1 Modèle d'habilités de Mayer et Salovey 2.1.2 Le modèle mixte de Goleman 2.1.3 Le modèle mixte de Bar-On 2.1.4 Modèle de traits de Petrides 2.2 Intelligence émotionnelle dans la recherche et l'éducation 2.3 La philosophie de l'intelligence émotionnelle 2.3.1 L'intelligence émotionnelle dans la philosophie orientale 3. Intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations 3.1 Travail émotionnel 3.2 La philosophie de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations 3.3 Critique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations 3.4 Éthique de l'intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations Conclusions Bibliographie DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.28567.93600 . (shrink)

An argumentation for the dualistic importance of emotions in society, individually and at community level. The current tendency of awareness and control of emotions through emotional intelligence has a beneficial effect in business and for the success of social activities but, if we are not careful, it can lead to irreversible alienation at individual and social level. The paper consists of three main parts: Emotions (Emotional models, Emotional processing, Happiness, Philosophy of emotions, Ethics of emotions), Emotional intelligence (Models of emotional (...) intelligence, Emotional intelligence in research and education, Philosophy of emotional intelligence, Emotional intelligence in Eastern philosophy), Emotional intelligence in organizations (Emotional work, Philosophy of emotional intelligence in organizations, Criticism of emotional intelligence in organizations, Ethics of emotional intelligence in organizations). In the Conclusions I present a summary of the statements in the paper. CONTENTS: Abstract 1. Emotions 1.1 Models of emotion 1.2 Processing emotions 1.3 Happiness 1.4 The philosophy of emotions 1.5 The ethics of emotions 2. Emotional intelligence 2.1 Models of emotional intelligence 2.1.1 Model of abilities of Mayer and Salovey 2.1.2 Goleman's mixed model 2.1.3 The mixed model of Bar-On 2.1.4 Petrides' model of traits 2.2 Emotional intelligence in research and education 2.3 The philosophy of emotional intelligence 2.3.1 Emotional intelligence in Eastern philosophy 3. Emotional intelligence in organizations 3.1 Emotional labor 3.2 The philosophy of emotional intelligence in organizations 3.3 Critique of emotional intelligence in organizations 3.4 Ethics of emotional intelligence in organizations Conclusions Bibliography DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32802.79041 . (shrink)

O argumentare a importanței dualiste a emoțiilor în societate, individual și la nivel de comunitate. Tendința actuală de conștientizare și control al emoțiilor prin inteligența emoțională are un efect benefic în afaceri și pentru succesul activităților sociale dar, dacă nu suntem atenți, poate duce la o alienare ireversibilă la nivel individual și social. Lucrarea se compune din trei părți principale: Emoții (Modele ale emoțiilor, Procesarea emoțiilor, Fericirea, Filosofia emoțiilor, Etica emotiilor), Inteligența emoțională (Modele ale inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în cercetare (...) și educație, Filosofia inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală) și Inteligența emoțională în organizații (Munca emoțională, Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații, Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații, Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații). În Concluzii prezint un rezumat al afirmațiilor din lucrare. CUPRINS: Abstract 1. Emoții 1.1 Modele ale emoțiilor 1.2 Procesarea emoțiilor 1.3 Fericirea 1.4 Filosofia emoțiilor 1.5 Etica emoțiilor 2. Inteligența emoțională 2.1 Modele ale inteligenței emoționale 2.1.1 Modelul de abilități al lui Mayer și Salovey 2.1.2 Modelul mixt al lui Goleman 2.1.3 Modelul mixt al lui Bar-On 2.1.4 Modelul de trăsături al lui Petrides 2.2 Inteligența emoțională în cercetare și educație 2.3 Filosofia inteligenței emoționale 2.3.1 Inteligența emoțională în filosofia orientală 3. Inteligența emoțională în organizații 3.1 Munca emoțională 3.2 Filosofia inteligenței emoționale în organizații 3.3 Critica inteligenței emoționale în organizații 3.4 Etica inteligenței emoționale în organizații Concluzii Bibliografie DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.32991.20640. (shrink)

Motivating my discussion is a puzzle in Spinoza’s account of the primary affects – his shift away from adopting Descartes’s list of six primitive passions in the Short Treatise to the three primary affects in the Ethics. I lay out this puzzle in Section 1. In Section 2, I approach this puzzle by considering the taxonomy offered by Descartes of the basic or primitive passions. In considering Descartes, I will also briefly consider Aquinas’s view since Descartes positions himself as rejecting (...) the Thomist account. Doing so brings out that the basic passions highlight structures of cognition for these thinkers. In Section 3, I return to Spinoza and consider what light his pared down account of the primary affects can shed on his account of the human mind. (shrink)

Emotion development research centrally concerns capacities to produce emotions and to think about them. We distinguish these enterprises and consider a novel account of how they might be related. On one recent account, the capacity to have emotions of various kinds comes by way of the acquisition of emotion concepts. This account relies on a constructionist theory of emotions and an embodied theory of emotion concepts. We explicate these elements, then raise a challenge for the approach. It appears to be (...) incompatible with various familiar ways in which cognitions about one’s own emotions can come apart from episodes of emotion. (shrink)

According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not similarly encumbered. (...) Recognizing this has two implications: biological mechanisms are more central to emotion than constructivism allows, and the conclusion that emotions aren’t natural kinds is premature. (shrink)

Mengzi maintained that both benevolence (ren 仁) and rightness (yi 義) are naturally-given in human nature. This view has occupied a dominant place in Confucian intellectual history. In Mencius 6A, Mengzi's interlocutor, Gaozi, contests this view, arguing that rightness is determined by (doing what is fitting, in line with) external circumstances. I discuss here some passages from the excavated Guodian texts, which lend weight to Gaozi's view. The texts reveal nuanced considerations of relational proximity and its limits, setting up requirements (...) for moral action in scenarios where relational ties do not play a motivational role. I set out yi's complexity in these discussions, highlighting its implications for (i) the nei-wai debate; (ii) the notion of yi as "rightness," or doing the right thing; and (iii) how we can understand the connection between virtue and right action in these early Confucian debates. This material from the excavated texts not only provides new perspectives on a longstanding investigation of human nature and morality, it also challenges prevailing views on Warring States Confucian intellectual history. In the well-known debate between Mengzi and Gaozi in Mencius 6A, Mengzi maintained that both ren and yi are naturally-given 1 in human nature. The figure 1 To say that ren and yi are naturally-given is not to say that they are fully-developed from the start. I use the phrase "naturally-given" throughout the paper to indicate where a particular capacity or resource (ren or yi) may be found, rather than its final polished state. (shrink)

Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that (...) evaluative standing as having the power to causally motivate the relevant attitude. I show this view can make sense of distinctive features of affective experiences, such as their valence and connection to value in a way which moves beyond current evaluativist views of affect. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that an understanding of what shame is through an understanding of its rationality and intentionality can provide a single framework that may be able to unify the research on shame, perhaps even across disciplines. To do so, I begin by explaining what a criterion for the ontological rationality of shame is, and I explain its relation to an understanding of what makes shame the kind of emotion that it is. In doing so, I demonstrate how (...) the rationality of shame, including the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame, is intimately intertwined with shame’s intentionality. Next, I consider some of the research on shame from the disciplines of philosophy and psychology in order to isolate the genus from the differentia of shame, and, with the inclusion of research from the discipline of sociology, I derive the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame. I follow this discussion by introducing an understanding of shame as a superordinate inference rule, which amounts to a non-standard account of shame, in order to fulfill the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame. I conclude by explaining how what I suggest as the core of shame—the superordinate inference rule of shame—fulfills the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame, by constituting the ontological rationality of shame, and I highlight the benefit of my account over alternative accounts of shame in regard to the rationality of our experiences of shame. I thereby argue in virtue of an inference to the best explanation for my proposal to fulfill the criterion for the ontological rationality of shame and to provide a single unifying framework for an understanding of what shame is. (shrink)

From all aspects of non-verbal behavior, the face is undoubtedly one of the richest and most important sources of information about the internal states of others. But facial expressions are rarely perceived in isolation. On the contrary, they are embedded in rich, dynamic social contexts that include body gestures and postures, situational knowledge, and so on. On the basis of these observations, we can naturally wonder if the overall context in which the face is embedded can change how emotions are (...) perceived in facial expressions. If so, in what ways, and what are the limits of these contextual effects? The purpose of this paper is to explore some possibilities concerning the role of context in emotion perception, from basic emotion theory, who holds that discrete emotion categories can be read out directly from the face in an invariant manner, to more contemporary approaches that assign a constitutive role for context in emotion perception. Although the debate is far from settled, the conclusions of the paper will point to a new way of looking at emotional phenomena, where the dyad of interaction becomes the basic unit of analysis, and where emotions are conceived as emergent properties of a relationship in particular contexts of interaction. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion. In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three (...) pieces of content: representations of the emoter’s body, something in the world, and a relevance relation between the objects of these first two pieces of content. I describe four general advantages I think the IRT offers. Finally, in Section 3, I elucidate and defend my account by contrasting it with another, similar proposal: Barlassina and Newen’s Impure Somatic Theory. In so doing, I explain two additional advantages of my view: first, it supports a unified explanation of all types of emotional response; and second, it offers the best framework for explaining how the representational contents of an emotion are integrated. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.

This book is about the various forms of anxiety—some familiar, some not—that color and shape our lives. The objective is two-fold. The first aim is to deepen our understanding of what anxiety is. The second aim is to re-orient thinking about the role of emotions in moral psychology and ethical theory. Here I argue that the current focus on backward looking moral emotions like guilt and shame leaves us with a picture that is badly incomplete. To get a better understanding (...) of emotions’ place in the moral and evaluative domains, we must take note of the important role that forward looking emotions—anxiety in particular—play in moral thought and action. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe philosophers of the self-styled ‘revolution in philosophy’ that went on to become the contemporary analytic tradition started a rumour about the British Idealists that has persisted to this day. Finding neither the substance of the idealist case, nor the style of idealistic writing, congenial to their modern taste, these Edwardians hinted that their Victorian forbears had argued from emotion rather than reason. No single paper could address this accusation across the board, for the movement in its entirety, and so (...) in this essay I focus on just one case, that of F. H. Bradley. Specifically, I identify the role he allows to feeling, emotion and what he terms ‘satisfaction’ in the determination of metaphysical and moral principles, and further ask whether the critics of idealism were right that there was something untoward in his approach. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)

Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be translated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view and therefore is not sufficient to (...) block one drawing conclusions for the metaphysics of time from the nature of our emotions. (shrink)

Recently, Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues have introduced the Theory of Constructed Emotions (TCE), in which emotions are constituted by a process of categorizing the self as being in an emotional state. The view, however, has several counterintuitive implications: for instance, a person can have multiple distinct emotions at once. Further, the TCE concludes that emotions are constitutively social phenomena. In this article, I explicate the TCE*, which, while substantially similar to the TCE, makes several distinct claims aimed at avoiding (...) the counterintuitive implications plaguing the TCE. Further, because of the changes that comprise the TCE*, emotions are not constitutively social phenomena. (shrink)

Can we feel emotions about abstract objects, assuming that abstract objects exist? I argue that at least some emotions can have abstract objects as their intentional objects and discuss why this conclusion is not just trivially true. Through critical engagement with the work of Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, I devote special attention to awe, an emotion that is particularly well suited to show that some emotions can be about either concrete or abstract objects. In responding to a possible objection, (...) according to which we can only feel emotions about things that we take to matter to our flourishing, and thus cannot feel emotions about causally inefficacious abstract objects, I explore how abstract objects can be relevant to human flourishing and discuss someemotions other than awe that can be about abstract objects. I finish by explaining somereasons why my conclusion matters, including the fact that it presents a challenge to perceptual theories of emotion and causal theories of intentionality. (shrink)

I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can perceive others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.

Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emotions. The second (...) part of the volume consists of studies of specific emotional phenomena, ranging from the emotion of being moved and the sense of uncanniness to jealousy, hatred, shame, contempt, anxiety, and grief. (shrink)

Many cultural variations in emotions have been documented in previous research, but a general theoretical framework involving cultural sources of these variations is still missing. The main goal of the present study was to determine what components of cultural complexity interact with the emotional experience and behavior of individuals. The proposed framework conceptually distinguishes five main components of cultural complexity relating to emotions: 1) emotion language, 2) conceptual knowledge about emotions, 3) emotion-related values, 4) feelings rules, i.e. norms for subjective (...) experience, and 5) display rules, i.e. norms for emotional expression. (shrink)

The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed by desire, meant as “hunger for being born completely” (Zambrano). The human being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such (...) hunger that directs human positioning into the world. (shrink)

In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In (...) section 2 I argue the same holds true for conative attitudes. And in section 3 I briefly mention some salient aspects of the version of nonreductive analysis I lean toward. (shrink)

Cognitivists about the emotions minimally hold that it is a necessary condition for being in an emotional state that one make a certain judgement or have a certain belief. For example, if I am angry with Sam, then I must believe that Sam has wronged me. Perhaps I must also elicit a certainly bodily response or undergo some relevant experience, but crucial to the view is the belief or judgement. In the face of ‘recalcitrant emotions’, this once very popular view (...) has come under heavy criticism that has led many theorists to either abandon the view or to offer more nuanced representational views of the emotions. Against what seems to now be received wisdom, I argue that cognitivists have tools at their disposal that allow them to alleviate the apparent conflicts presented by cases of recalcitrance. But I also believe that cognitivists are still in trouble. Although cognitivists have a range of underexplored resources, their use comes at a high cost. In particular, cognitivists must adopt a widespread and thoroughgoing inaccessibility to our own thoughts and judgements that should strike one as implausible. It is mental opacity rather than mental conflict that is the real problem posed by recalcitrance. (shrink)

In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, Franz Brentano is known mostly for his thesis that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental.’ Among Brentano scholars, there are also lively debates on his theory of consciousness and his theory of judgment. Brentano’s theory of will and emotion is less widely discussed, even within the circles of Brentano scholarship. In this paper, I want to show that this is a missed opportunity, certainly for Brentano scholars but also for contemporary philosophy of mind. (...) Brentano’s accounts of the will and of emotion are, I will argue, both insightful, creative, and surprising, on the one hand, and strikingly plausible, upon reflection, on the other. (shrink)