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  1. added 2019-02-12
    How We Hope: A Moral Psychology, by Adrienne M. Martin. [REVIEW]Rachel Fredericks - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):906-909.
  2. added 2019-01-02
    Does Modularity Undermine the Pro-Emotion Consensus?Raamy Majeed - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    There is a growing consensus that emotions contribute positively to human practical rationality. While arguments that defend this position often appeal to the modularity of emotion-generation mechanisms, these arguments are also susceptible to the criticism, e.g. by Jones (2006), that emotional modularity supports pessimism about the prospects of emotions contributing positively to practical rationality here and now. This paper aims to respond to this criticism by demonstrating how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive influence required to (...)
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  3. added 2019-01-01
    Hume's Science of Emotions: Feeling Theory Without Tears.Mark Collier - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):3-18.
    We must rethink the status of Hume’s science of emotions. Contemporary philosophers typically dismiss Hume’s account on the grounds that he mistakenly identifies emotions with feelings. But the traditional objections to Hume’s feeling theory are not as strong as commonly thought. Hume makes several important contributions, moreover, to our understanding of the operations of the emotions. His claims about the causal antecedents of the indirect passions receive support from studies in appraisal theory, for example, and his suggestions concerning the social (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-15
    Unification Through the Rationalities and Intentionalities of Shame.Cecilea Mun - forthcoming - In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Shame: Methods, Theories, Norms, Cultures, and Politics. Lanham: Lexington Books.
    In this chapter, I argue that an understanding of what shame is through an understanding of its rationality and intentionality can provide a single framework that may be able to unify the research on shame, perhaps even across disciplines. To do so, I begin by explaining what a criterion for the ontological rationality of shame is, and I explain its relation to an understanding of what makes shame the kind of emotion that it is. In doing so, I demonstrate how (...)
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  5. added 2018-12-15
    Interdisciplinary Foundations for the Science of Emotion: Unification Without Consilience.Cecilea Mun - forthcoming - Lanham, MD 20706, USA: Lexington Books.
    Part I, Fundamentals -/- Chapter 1, The Problem of Intentionality -/- Chapter 2, Original Intentionality -/- Chapter 3, The Intentionality of Emotions -/- Chapter 4, The Rationality of Emotions -/- Chapter 5, How Emotions Mean -/- Chapter 6, How Emotions Know -/- Part II, The Science of Emotion -/- Chapter 7, Meta-Semantic Realism about the Science of Emotion -/- Chapter 8, Semantic Dualism about Emotion.
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  6. added 2018-12-14
    What Sentimentalists Should Say About Emotions.Charlie Kurth - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Recent work by emotion researchers indicates that emotions have a multi-level structure. Sophisticated sentimentalists should take note of this work—for it better enables them to defend a substantive role for emotion in moral cognition. Contra the rationalist criticisms of May 2018, emotions are not only able to carry morally relevant information but can also substantially influence moral judgment and reasoning.
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  7. added 2018-11-06
    On Affect: Function and Phenomenology.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Humana Mente 11 (34):155-184.
    This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can be overcome.
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  8. added 2018-09-19
    On the Intentionality of the Emotions (and of Other Appetitive Acts).Martin Pickavé - 2010 - Quaestio 10:45-63.
    In recent philosophical debates about the nature of human emotions the intentionality of emotions plays a key part. The article explores how medieval philosophers of the late 13th and early 14th centuries accounted for the fact that our emotions, such as love, hate, anger and the like, are intentional mental states, states that are ‘of’ or ‘about something’. Since medieval philosophers agree that emotions are essentially movements of the appetitive powers, the intentionality of emotions is part of the broader problem (...)
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  9. added 2018-09-17
    Are Emotions Psychological Constructions?Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Philosophy of Science.
    According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015, Russell 2004). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not (...)
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  10. added 2018-09-14
    What Emotions Really Are (In the Theory of Constructed Emotion).Jeremy Pober - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):640-59.
    Recently, Lisa Feldman Barrett and colleagues have introduced the Theory of Constructed Emotions (TCE), in which emotions are constituted by a process of categorizing the self as being in an emotional state. The view, however, has several counterintuitive implications: for instance, a person can have multiple distinct emotions at once. Further, the TCE concludes that emotions are constitutively social phenomena. In this article, I explicate the TCE*, which, while substantially similar to the TCE, makes several distinct claims aimed at avoiding (...)
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  11. added 2018-09-09
    Normativity, Realism and Emotional Experience.Michael-John Turp - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-18.
    Norms are standards against which actions, dispositions of mind and character, states of affairs and so forth can be measured. They also govern our behaviour, make claims on us, bind us and provide reasons for action and thought that motivate us. J. L. Mackie argued that the intrinsic prescriptivity, or to-be-pursuedness, of moral norms would make them utterly unlike anything else that we know of. Therefore, we should favour an error theory of morality. Mackie thought that the to-be-pursuedness would have (...)
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  12. added 2018-08-31
    What Basic Emotions Really Are: Encapsulated or Integrated?Isaac Wiegman - manuscript
    While there is ongoing debate about the existence of basic emotions and about their status as natural kinds, these debates usually carry on under the assumption that BEs are encapsulated from cognition and that this is one of the criteria that separates the products of evolution from the products of culture and experience. I aim to show that this assumption is entirely unwarranted, that there is empirical evidence against it, and that evolutionary theory itself should not lead us to expect (...)
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  13. added 2018-08-26
    Ovids Remedia amoris aus affektpsychologischer Sicht.Jula Wildberger - 2007 - In Markus Janka, Ulrich Schmitzer & Helmut Seng (eds.), Ovid: Werk -- Kultur -- Wirkung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 85-112.
    Discusses Ovid's reception of contemporary theories of emotions and emotion therapy in the Remedia Amoris, his didactic elegy on Cures of Love.
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  14. added 2018-08-15
    Emotional Phenomenology: Toward a Nonreductive Analysis.Arnaud Dewalque - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):27-40.
    In this article I want to create a presumption in favor of a nonreductive analysis of emotional phenomenology. The presumption relies on the claim that none of the nonemotional elements which are usually regarded as constitutive of emotional phenomenology may reasonably be considered responsible for the evaluative character of the latter. In section 1 I suggest this is true of cognitive elements, arguing that so-called ‘evaluative’ judgments usually result from emotional, evaluative attitudes, and should not be conflated with them. In (...)
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  15. added 2018-07-25
    Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin.Giovanna Colombetti, Joel Krueger & Tom Roberts - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:1-2.
  16. added 2018-06-26
    Components of Cultural Complexity Relating to Emotions: A Conceptual Framework.Radek Trnka, Iva Poláčková Šolcová & Peter Tavel - 2018 - New Ideas in Psychology 51:27-33.
    Many cultural variations in emotions have been documented in previous research, but a general theoretical framework involving cultural sources of these variations is still missing. The main goal of the present study was to determine what components of cultural complexity interact with the emotional experience and behavior of individuals. The proposed framework conceptually distinguishes five main components of cultural complexity relating to emotions: 1) emotion language, 2) conceptual knowledge about emotions, 3) emotion-related values, 4) feelings rules, i.e. norms for subjective (...)
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  17. added 2018-06-06
    What Kind of Evaluative States Are Emotions? The Attitudinal Theory Vs. The Perceptual Theory of Emotions.Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...)
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  18. added 2018-05-12
    Dietrich von Hildebrand.Jean Moritz Müller - forthcoming - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London, UK: Routledge.
    It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “the philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there (...)
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  19. added 2018-04-04
    The Anxious Mind: An Investigation Into the Varieties and Virtues of Anxiety.Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    This book is about the various forms of anxiety—some familiar, some not—that color and shape our lives. The objective is two-fold. The first aim is to deepen our understanding of what anxiety is. The second aim is to re-orient thinking about the role of emotions in moral psychology and ethical theory. Here I argue that the current focus on backward looking moral emotions like guilt and shame leaves us with a picture that is badly incomplete. To get a better understanding (...)
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  20. added 2018-03-12
    Relatively Fitting Emotions and Apparently Objective Values.Cain Todd - 2014 - In Sabine Roeser & Cain Samuel Todd (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford University Press.
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  21. added 2018-02-17
    The Mess Inside: Narrative, Emotion, and the Mind.Peter Goldie - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Narrative thinking -- Narrative thinking about one's past -- Grief : a case study -- Narrative thinking about one's future -- Self-forgiveness : a case study -- The narrative sense of self -- Narrative, truth, life, and fiction.
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  22. added 2018-02-17
    What Can Kant Teach Us About Emotions?Maria Borges - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):140-158.
  23. added 2018-02-17
    Commentary on "Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes&Quot.Maria Miceli & Cristiano Castelfranchi - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (2):129-133.
  24. added 2018-02-17
    A New Approach to Sortre's Theory of Emotions.Glen A. Mazis - 1983 - Philosophy Today 27 (3):183-199.
  25. added 2018-02-02
    The Elements of Emotion.Chad Brockman - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):163-186.
    I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion. In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three (...)
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  26. added 2017-12-06
    Uma análise crítica das relações entre cognição, paixões e ação na perspectiva cartesiana.Marcos Antonio Alves - 2016 - Revista Estudos Filosóficos 16:55-74.
  27. added 2017-11-08
    How to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes.Jean Moritz Müller - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):281-308.
    It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...)
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  28. added 2017-11-05
    Emotion as Position-Taking.Jean Mueller - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):525-540.
    It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...)
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  29. added 2017-06-28
    Appropriate Emotions and the Metaphysics of Time.Olley Pearson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1945-1961.
    Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be translated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view and therefore is not sufficient to (...)
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  30. added 2017-06-24
    Montaigne : une anthropologie des passions.Emiliano Ferrari - 2014 - Paris, France: Classiques Garnier.
    This is the first study dedicated to Montaigne's philosophy of the passions. It presents the wisdom of the Essays in a new light. Theoretically original, Montaigne’s anthropology of the passions has a great impact on modern philosophers as Descartes and Hobbes.
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  31. added 2017-06-16
    Gefühle und Gedanken. Entwurf einer adverbialen Emotionstheorie.Anja Berninger - 2017 - Münster: Mentis.
  32. added 2017-04-13
    Can Emotions Have Abstract Objects? The Example of Awe.Fredericks Rachel - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):733-746.
    Can we feel emotions about abstract objects, assuming that abstract objects exist? I argue that at least some emotions can have abstract objects as their intentional objects and discuss why this conclusion is not just trivially true. Through critical engagement with the work of Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, I devote special attention to awe, an emotion that is particularly well suited to show that some emotions can be about either concrete or abstract objects. In responding to a possible objection, (...)
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  33. added 2017-03-17
    A Contemporary View of Brentano’s Theory of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):64-87.
    In this paper I consider Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion. I focus on three of its central claims: (i) emotions are sui generis intentional phenomena; (ii) emotions are essentially evaluative phenomena; (iii) emotions provide the basis of an epistemology of objective value. I argue that all three claims are correct, and I weave together Brentano’s arguments with some of my own to support them. In the course of defending these claims, Brentano argues that ‘feeling and will’ are united into the (...)
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  34. added 2017-03-08
    Emotionally Charged: The Puzzle of Affective Valence.Fabrice Teroni - forthcoming - In Fabrice Teroni, Christine Tappolet & Anita Konzelmann Ziv (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the Soul. New York, USA: Routledge.
  35. added 2017-03-08
    Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions: Shadows of the Soul.Christine Tappolet, Fabrice Teroni & Anita Konzelman Ziv - 2018 - Routledge.
    Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions, such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emotions. The second (...)
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  36. added 2017-03-03
    Brentano on Emotion and the Will.Michelle Montague - 2017 - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 110-123.
    Franz Brentano’s theory of emotion is tightly bound up with many of his other central claims, in such a way that one has to work out how it relates to these other claims if one is to understand its distinctive character. There are two main axes of investigation. The first results from the fact that Brentano introduces his theory of emotion as part of his overall theory of mind, which consists of a number of closely interconnected theses concerning the nature (...)
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  37. added 2017-03-02
    Embodiment, Context-Sensitivity, and Discrete Emotions: A Response to Moors.Gina Eickers, Juan R. Loaiza & Jesse Prinz - 2017 - Psychological Inquiry 28 (1):31-38.
  38. added 2017-03-02
    Delectatio, Gaudium, Fruitio. Three Kinds of Pleasure for Three Kinds of Knowledge in Thomas Aquinas.Daniel De Haan - 2015 - Quaestio 15:543-552.
    This paper investigates Thomas Aquinas’s threefold division of pleasure into delectatio, gaudium, and fruitio, and its taxonomical basis in his threefold division of knowledge into tactility, the cogitative power, and the intellect. -/- Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three ways in which the sensory and intellectual appetites rest in the good. When the will rests in the intellectually apprehended good, this act is called fruitio; when the concupiscible appetite rests in a good apprehended by the internal senses this passion is called gaudium; (...)
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  39. added 2017-02-09
    Emotion and Satisfaction in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley.W. J. Mander - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (4):681-699.
    ABSTRACTThe philosophers of the self-styled ‘revolution in philosophy’ that went on to become the contemporary analytic tradition started a rumour about the British Idealists that has persisted to this day. Finding neither the substance of the idealist case, nor the style of idealistic writing, congenial to their modern taste, these Edwardians hinted that their Victorian forbears had argued from emotion rather than reason. No single paper could address this accusation across the board, for the movement in its entirety, and so (...)
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  40. added 2016-12-23
    Desires, Values and Norms.Olivier Massin - forthcoming - In Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
    The thesis defended, the “guise of the ought”, is that the formal objects of desires are norms (oughts to be or oughts to do) rather than values (as the “guise of the good” thesis has it). It is impossible, in virtue of the nature of desire, to desire something without it being presented as something that ought to be or that one ought to do. This view is defended by pointing to a key distinction between values and norms: positive and (...)
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  41. added 2016-12-23
    Thinking Sadly: In Favor of an Adverbial Theory of Emotions.Anja Berninger - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):799-812.
    Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.
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  42. added 2016-12-23
    Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions.Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):209-225.
    Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel (...)
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  43. added 2016-12-23
    From Affect Programs to Dynamical Discrete Emotions.Giovanna Colombetti - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):407-425.
    According to Discrete Emotion Theory, a number of emotions are distinguishable on the basis of neural, physiological, behavioral and expressive features. Critics of this view emphasize the variability and context-sensitivity of emotions. This paper discusses some of these criticisms, and argues that they do not undermine the claim that emotions are discrete. This paper also presents some works in dynamical affective science, and argues that to conceive of discrete emotions as self-organizing and softly assembled patterns of various processes accounts more (...)
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  44. added 2016-12-08
    Emotion, Perception and Perspective.Julien A. Deonna - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...)
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  45. added 2016-12-08
    Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions.Robert C. Solomon (ed.) - 2004 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Philosophers since Aristotle have explored emotion, and the study of emotion has always been essential to the love of wisdom. In recent years Anglo-American philosophers have rediscovered and placed new emphasis on this very old discipline. The view that emotions are ripe for philosophical analysis has been supported by a considerable number of excellent publications. In this volume, Robert Solomon brings together some of the best Anglo-American philosophers now writing on the philosophy of emotion, with chapters from philosophers who have (...)
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  46. added 2016-12-08
    From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category.Thomas Dixon - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
    Today there is a thriving 'emotions industry' to which philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists are contributing. Yet until two centuries ago 'the emotions' did not exist. In this path-breaking study Thomas Dixon shows how, during the nineteenth century, the emotions came into being as a distinct psychological category, replacing existing categories such as appetites, passions, sentiments and affections. By examining medieval and eighteenth-century theological psychologies and placing Charles Darwin and William James within a broader and more complex nineteenth-century setting, Thomas Dixon (...)
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  47. added 2016-12-08
    The Nature of Emotions.Aaron Ben-Zeev - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (3):393 - 409.
  48. added 2016-12-08
    A Ristotle and the Emotions.Stephen R. Leighton - 1982 - Phronesis 27 (1):144-174.
    Reprinted in Aristotle's Ethics, edited by T. Irwin, Garland Press, 1995; revised in Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, edited by A. Rorty, University of California Press, 1996.
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  49. added 2016-12-05
    Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):41-59.
    A prominent view of phenomenal consciousness combines two claims: (i) the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states can be fully accounted for in terms of these states’ representational content; (ii) this representational content can be fully accounted for in non-phenomenal terms. This paper presents an argument against this view. The core idea is that the identity conditions of phenomenally conscious states are not fixed entirely by what these states represent (their representational contents), but depend in part on how they represent (...)
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  50. added 2016-12-05
    Emotion.Carolyn Price - 2015 - Polity.
    Emotion is at the centre of our personal and social lives. To love or to hate, to be frightened or grateful is not just a matter of how we feel on the inside: our emotional responses direct our thoughts and actions, unleash our imaginations, and structure our relationships with others. Yet the role of emotion in human life has long been disputed. Is emotion reason?s friend or its foe? From where do the emotions really arise? Why do we need them (...)
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1 — 50 / 230