Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):357 – 373 (2009)

Dirk Greimann
Universidade Federal Fluminense
In almost all of his writings on ontology, Quine celebrated the discovery of contextual definition as a milestone of the history of philosophy. The philosophical appeal of this tool resides in the hope that it allows us to reduce the ontological commitments of theories in substantial ways. The goal of this paper is to show that contextual definition does not really come up to this hope. It is argued that the material adequacy of such definitions presupposes a very strong context-principle, one implying that theories do not have any ontological commitments at all
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802587333
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References found in this work BETA

Ways of Worldmaking.Nelson Goodman - 1978 - Harvester Press.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
From a Logical Point of View.Richard M. Martin - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (4):574-575.
Quine.Peter Hylton - 2007 - Routledge.

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A Typology of Conceptual Explications.Dirk Greimann - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (34):645-670.

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