Philosophical Studies 91 (1):61-90 (1998)

Authors
Mitchell Green
University of Connecticut
Abstract
On some formulations of Direct Reference the semantic value, relative to a context of utterance, of a rigid singular term is just its referent. In response to the apparent possibility of a difference in truth value of two sentences just alike save for containing distinct but coreferential rigid singular terms, some proponents of Direct Reference have held that any two such sentences differ only pragmatically. Some have also held, more specifically, that two such sentences differ by conveying distinct conversational implicata, and that a conflation of implicatum with semantic content leads speakers to judge such sentences capable of differing in truth value. It is argued here that this latter defense of Direct Reference employs false explanans, on the ground that speakers conflate semantic content with implicatum only in quite special cases, and we have independent grounds for thinking that sentences reporting speech acts and attitudes are not cases of this sort.
Keywords Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004212614842
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A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language.Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
Conversation and Common Ground.Mitchell Green - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1587-1604.
Empty Names and `Gappy' Propositions.Anthony Everett - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (1):1-36.
Embedded Implicatures.Francois Recanati - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):299–332.

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