Abstract

Although it often chafed at scientists' wishes to promote international cooperation, the U.S. Navy was a great supporter of such initiatives during the 1950s. This essay examines the impetus for the Navy's alliance with scientists to bolster its antisubmarine capabilities, the reasons for its acceptance of international cooperation as a means to ensure its technological capabilities during a general war, and the source of its clashes with scientists over the issue of classification. Using diverse sources, including the records of the Navy's Strategic Plans Division, the essay illustrates that, despite the confluence of interests between the Navy and oceanographers, there was a decisive difference in their views as to the ultimate utility of basic research. This difference stemmed largely from scientists' limited perception of science as the capital for new technology and the Navy's perception of science as the collection of operational data for existing technology. This essay, which takes the Navy's views more fully into account, brings to light an issue that should be an important component of any analysis of scientists working with the military