History of Science

Nickles (2016, 2017, forthcoming) raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end (...) of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true. (shrink)

For centuries the case of Galileo Galilei has been the cornerstone of every major argument against the church and its supposedly unscientific dogmatism. The church seems to have condemned Galileo for his heresies, just because it couldn’t and wouldn’t handle the truth. Galileo was a hero of science wrongfully accused and now – at last – everyone knows that. But is that true? This paper tries to examine the case from the point of modern physics and the conclusions drawn are (...) startling. It seems that contemporary church was too haste into condemning itself. The evidence provided by Galileo to support the heliocentric system do not even pass simple scrutiny, while modern physics has ruled for a long time now against both heliocentric and geocentric models as depictions of the “truth”. As Einstein eloquently said, the debate about which system is chosen is void of any meaning from a physics’ point of view. At the end, the selection of the center is more a matter of choice rather than a matter of ‘truth’ of any kind. And this choice is driven by specific philosophical axioms penetrating astronomy for hundreds of years now. From Galileo to Hubble, the Copernican principle has been slowly transformed to a dogma followed by all mainstream astronomers. It is time to challenge our dogmatic adherence to the anti-humanism idea that we are insignificant in the cosmos and start making true honest science again, as Copernicus once postulated. (shrink)

The problem of unconceived alternatives can be undermined, regardless of whether the possibility space of alternatives is bounded or unbounded. If it is bounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already eliminated enough false alternatives. If it is unbounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the possibility space of false alternatives (...) to the possibility space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space. (shrink)

Empirical multiple determination (multiple determination, for short) is the epistemic strategy of establishing the same result by means of multiple and independent procedures. It is an important epistemic strategy praised by both philosophers of science and practicing scientists. Commentators from different contexts have referred to multiple determination as one of the main strategies that researchers use to establish the reliability of their results. Multiple determination has been used to address a variety of problems that arise because of the fallibility of (...) experimental procedures. It is generally believed that being able to establish the same result (or provide evidence for a hypothesis of interest) by means of different and independent procedures is somewhat ‘‘better’’ than doing the same by a single procedure. Despite the heavy appeal to the multiple determination strategy, however, not much philosophical analysis has been provided regarding the grounds on which its epistemic desirability and virtues rest. Not much has been said regarding the structure and rationale underlying arguments which rely on multiple determination, and there is no general agreement regarding the epistemological import of these arguments. In my dissertation, I address these issues. More specifically, my dissertation: a. Provides a conceptual clarification of the epistemic strategy of multiple determination by making evident its differences, in both structure and epistemic import, from other notions and epistemic strategies from which it is often not distinguished in the literature such as robustness, consilience of inductions, variety of evidence, etc. b. Traces the historical and philosophical roots of multiple determination in the 19th century philosophical discussions and scientific developments. Especially, it makes the claim that the emergence of empirical multiple determination as a distinctive epistemic strategy emerged as a response to the scientific and philosophical difficulties facing the atomic and molecular hypotheses of matter and, more generally, the study of unobservable entities, in the end of the 19th century. c. Provides a general conceptual framework for understanding the structure and epistemic import of arguments that rely on the application of the multiple determination strategy in actual scientific research. d. The distinctive feature of my dissertation is that it examines its subject matter from a temporal perspective, by paying close attention to the historical emergence and development of the multiple determination strategy. As such, it also considers the implications of the debates regarding the structure and epistemic import of multiple determination for the relationship between history of science and philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper, I challenge the traditional narrative that William James’s arguments against determinism were primarily motivated by his personal struggles with depression. I argue that James presents an alternative argument against determinism that is motivated by his commitment to sound scientific practice. James argues that determinism illegitimately extrapolates from observations of past events to predictions about future events without acknowledging the distinct metaphysical difference between them. This occupation with futurity suggests that James’s true target is better understood as logical (...) determinism rather than causal determinism. This has consequences for James’s proposed alternative, which I call his probabilistic underdeterminism, a conception of the universe that is built on chance, choice, and a local teleology. All of this forms part of a broader criticism of the scientific practices of his day based on their widespread failure to acknowledge the distorting effects of observation on that which is observed. (shrink)

In this essay I argue for the need to restore our recognition of the importance of philosophical truth in our endeavor to understand our world and our selves. In particular, I note that the physical sciences have no way of examining the axiological dimension of being - i.e., that dimension from which values spring - whereas an appreciation for, and understanding of, our values is crucial to the conduct of our personal, interpersonal, and political lives.

This article compares the research literature published by Goethe and Schopenhauer on the subject of evolutionary theory. The metatheoretical thesis is supported that the results of any comparison between Schopenhauer or Goethe and a concrete theory of evolution always depend on three dimensions: 1. the scientific point of view of the comparative, 2. the meaning and definition of the central terms and 3. the selection of the analyzed primary literature. It is also argued that no previously published study was able (...) to present convincing arguments for the fact that Schopenhauer or Goethe represented a 'theory of evolution'. (shrink)

Face à la diversité et à la complexification des modes de formalisation, une épistémologie des méthodes scientifiques doit confronter directement ses analyses à une pluralité d’études de cas comparatives. C’est l’objectif de cet ouvrage. -/- Aussi, dans une première partie, propose-t-il d’abord une classification large et raisonnée des différentes fonctions de connaissance des théories, des modèles et des simulations (de fait, cette partie constitue un panorama d’épistémologie générale particulièrement poussé). C’est ensuite à la lumière de cette classification que les deux (...) parties centrales analysent et distinguent les assises conceptuelles et épistémologiques des principaux types de formalisation en géographie avant et après l’ordinateur (théories des localisations, modèles gravitaires, loi rang-taille). En employant toujours la même méthode analytique et comparative, la dernière partie se concentre sur l’explication épistémologique des trois révolutions computationnelles récentes : l’analyse des données, la présentation des données et enfin l’analyse par simulation computationnelle. -/- Au travers de cette enquête approfondie, la géographie apparaît non seulement comme une discipline carrefour, ayant pour cela donné des exemples de presque tous les types de modèles scientifiques, mais aussi comme une science innovante en termes épistémologiques. Car ce qui a d’abord été pour elle un frein à la formalisation -– sa sensibilité au caractère multifactoriel comme à la dimension irréductiblement spatiale des phénomènes sociaux – et qui l’obligea longtemps à inféoder ses théories et modèles à des disciplines plus aisément formalisables comme la géomorphologie, l’économie, la sociologie, la démographie, ou bien encore la thermodynamique et la théorie des systèmes, devient aujourd’hui un atout dès lors que, parmi les sciences humaines et sociales, elle peut développer une épistémologie non seulement pluraliste mais aussi combinatoire et intégrative. -/- Préface de Denise Pumain (Université Paris 1). (shrink)