What economics is not: An economist's response to Rosenberg

Philosophy of Science 51 (3):495-503 (1984)
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Abstract

Alexander Rosenberg (1983) has argued, contrary to his previous work in the philosophy of economics, that economics is not science, and it is merely mathematics. The following paper argues that Rosenberg fails to demonstrate either of these two claims. The questions of the predictive weakness of modern economics and the cognitive standing of abstract economic theory are discussed in detail

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D. Hands
University of Puget Sound

Citations of this work

Lakatosian Consolations for Economics.Alexander Rosenberg - 1986 - Economics and Philosophy 2 (1):127.
Appraising general equilibrium analysis.E. Roy Weintraub - 1985 - Economics and Philosophy 1 (1):23-.
Science, biases, and the threat of global pessimism.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S467-.

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References found in this work

The Methodology of Economics.M. Blaug - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):289-295.
If Economics Isn't Science, What Is It?Alexander Rosenberg - 1983 - Philosophical Forum 14 (3):296.
The Foundations of Economic Method.Lawrence A. Boland - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):215-221.

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