The principle of avoidable blame


Authors
Gerald K. Harrison
Massey University
Abstract
Many now accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP). But, in this paper I argue that even if Frankfurt-style cases refute PAP they do not refute a related principle: the principle of avoidable blame (PAB). My argument develops from the observation that an agent in a Frankfurt-style case can be aware of the nature of their situation without this undermining their moral responsibility. I then argue that PAB captures all that is important about PAP such that the refutation of PAP is of no concern as long as PAB survives.
Keywords moral responsability  blame  Frankfurt-style cases
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