Neuron doctrine: Trivial versus radical versus do not dichotomize

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):839-840 (1999)
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Abstract

Gold & Stoljar argue that there are two (often confused) neuron doctrines, one trivial and the other radical, with only the latter having the consequence that non-neuroscientific sciences of the mind will be discarded. They also attempt to show that there is no evidence supporting the radical doctrine. It is argued here that their dichotomy is artificial and misrepresents modern approaches to understanding the neuroscientific correlates of cognition and behavior.

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