Truth

In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272 (2005)
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Abstract

What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed his treatment of the subject in the light of subsequent discussions, while preserving the distinctive format that made the earlier edition so successful.

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Paul Horwich
New York University

Citations of this work

Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.

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