Dialectica 43 (43):289-292 (1989)

Charles Sayward
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Various authors of logic texts are cited who either suggest or explicitly state that the Gödel incompleteness result shows that some unprovable sentence of arithmetic is true. Against this, the paper argues that the matter is one of philosophical controversy, that it is not a mathematical or logical issue.
Keywords Mates  Massey  Stoll  Jeffreys  Goedel  incompleteness  mathematical truth
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00945.x
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References found in this work BETA

Elementary Logic.Benson Mates - 1965 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Introduction to Symbolic Logic.John L. Pollock - 1969 - New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Understanding Symbolic Logic.Gerald J. Massey - 1970 - New York: Harper & Row.
An Introduction to Symbolic Logic.N. E. - 1954 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 4 (22):141-141.

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