Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality [Book Review]

Mind and Society 5 (2):199-211 (2006)
An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the independence postulate according to minimal rationality
Keywords V-admissibility  Maximality   E-admissibility  Value structure  Extended value structure  Categorical preference  Revealed preference  Independence or sure thing principle
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11299-006-0017-z
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,470
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Isaac Levi (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

11 ( #381,719 of 1,925,564 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #418,223 of 1,925,564 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.