Use-novelty, severity, and a systematic neglect of relevant alternatives

Philosophy of Science 66 (3):413 (1999)
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Abstract

This paper analyzes Deborah Mayo's recent criticism of use-novelty requirement. She claims that her severity criterion captures actual scientific practice better than use-novelty, and that use-novelty is not a necessary condition for severity. Even though certain cases in which evidence used for the construction of the hypothesis can test the hypothesis severely, I do not think that her severity criterion fits better with our intuition about good tests than use-novelty. I argue for this by showing a parallelism in terms of severity between the confidence interval case and what she calls 'gellerization'. To account for the difference between these cases, we need to take into account certain additional considerations like a systematic neglect of relevant alternatives

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Why did Einstein's programme supersede lorentz's? (II).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):223-262.
Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.

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