Love's realism: Iris Murdoch and the importance of being human

European Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Defenders of two Rationality Views of love—the Qualities View and the Personhood View—have drawn on Iris Murdoch's philosophical writings to highlight a connection between love and a “realistic” perspective on the beloved. Murdoch does not inform the basic structure of these views—she is rather introduced as a supplement who shows that in love, we pay accurate, nuanced, unguarded, and unflinching attention to the other. In this paper, I contend that these authors have failed to see that Murdoch offers a distinct view of love and is inappropriate to enlist as an ally. This is in large part because they have missed the full sense of what Murdoch means by connecting love and realism. I contend that for Murdoch, to love someone means seeing them in light of a realistic vision of what it means to be human; this includes an appreciation of the limits of freedom, the formative influence of personal history, and the nature and extent of our differences from one another. This helps us to see why Murdoch variously describes loving attention as realistic, compassionate, tolerant, and extremely difficult. It also sheds light on some important and familiar ways that we criticize one another's grounds for love.

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Lesley Jamieson
University of Pardubice

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References found in this work

Love as a moral emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
Love’s Vision.Troy Jollimore - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
Inside Ethics: On the Demands of Moral Thought.Alice Crary - 2016 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Grace and Alienation.Vida Yao - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (16):1-18.
Love and the Value of a Life.Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):251-280.

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