Metaphysica 12 (2):101-115 (2011)

Authors
Greg Janzen
University of Calgary (PhD)
Abstract
Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic or relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail in a rather obvious way--they beg the question--and so even though there may be arguments that provide grounds to fuss about whether our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness are defective, Thomson, Lewis, and Sider's arguments are not among them
Keywords Endurantism  Perdurantism  Mereology  Temporary intrinsics  Leibniz’s law
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DOI 10.1007/s12133-011-0079-1
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.

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