Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):193–212 (2006)
Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and (...) challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.
|Keywords||character, ETHICS, intellectual virtue, knowledge, RELIABILITY, RESPONSIBILITY, VIRTUE epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Toward a 'Responsibilist' Epistemology.Lorraine Code - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):29-50.
``Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology".Guy Axtell - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1--27.
Citations of this work BETA
Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education.James Macallister - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 46 (2):251-270.
Active Externalism, Virtue Reliabilism and Scientific Knowledge.Spyridon Palermos - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2955-2986.
Unifying the Intellectual Virtues.Christopher Lepock - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):106-128.
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