Modal knowledge, counterfactual knowledge and the role of experience

Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):693-701 (2008)
Abstract
In recent work Timothy Williamson argues that the epistemology of metaphysical modality is a special case of the epistemology of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson has not provided an adequate argument for this controversial claim, and that it is not obvious how what he says should be supplemented in order to derive such an argument. But I suggest that an important moral of his discussion survives this point. The moral is that experience could play an epistemic role which is more epistemically significant than a mere 'enabling' role but not equivalent to an evidential role.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.579.x
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Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden's Tale.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):1-29.
Williamsonian Modal Epistemology, Possibility-Based.Barbara Vetter - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):766-795.
Thought Experiments Outside Science. [REVIEW]Daniel Cohnitz - 2013 - Metascience 22 (online first):1-5.

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