Molinism and the Person-Will Paradigm

Philosophia Christi 22 (2):289-306 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The traditional Molinist scheme implies that God is one center of consciousness, knowledge, and will. The person-will paradigm, however, claims there are three centers of consciousness, knowledge, and will in the Godhead. I argue that the Molinist ought to reject the person-will paradigm, and thus reject both monothelitism and social trinitarianism. I begin by presenting standard accounts of Molinism, monothelitism, and social trinitarianism. Then I consider three approaches to reconciling Molinism and the person-will paradigm. I show that each approach is fraught with difficulties.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,590

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Modest Molinism.Michael Bergmann - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 8 (2).
The Neo-Molinist Square Collapses.Kirk R. MacGregor - 2016 - Philosophia Christi 18 (1):195-206.
Complete Concept Molinism.Godehard Brüntrup & Ruben Schneider - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):93-108.
Personal responsibility and middle knowledge: a challenge for the Molinist.Joseph Shieber - 2009 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 66 (2):61-70.
I. The problem of Molinist conditionals.Edwin Mares & Ken Perszyk - 2011 - In Ken Perszyk (ed.), Molinism: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 96.
Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!William Hasker - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):126-131.
Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?Justin Mooney - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10 (2):131-148.
Agent Causation and Responsibility.Michael Bergmann - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (2):229-235.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-03-19

Downloads
16 (#227,957)

6 months
2 (#1,816,284)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references