Inquiry 28 (1-4):429-440 (1985)
Certain facts about subjective successions support, I hold, a theory of mind?dependent sensory data. Suppose that no such theory is true and, furthermore, that as one experiences a visual subjective succession, that of which one is visually aware consists typically in a static physical array. Nevertheless one will, I hold, experience a certain change taking place within one's visual field; and under the imagined conditions, it is hard to fathom what this change could be. Various seemingly plausible and helpful suggestions are examined and rejected. I conclude that neither a common?sense realism nor, in fact, any view which rejects mind?dependent sensory data can deal satisfactorily with subjective successions
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