Unification, reduction, and non-ideal explanations

Synthese 112 (1):75-96 (1997)
Authors
Todd Jones
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Abstract
Kitcher's unification theory of explanation seems to suggest that only the most reductive accounts can legitimately be termed explanatory. This is not what we find in actual scientific practice. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile these ideas. I claim that Kitcher's theory picks out ideal explanations, but that our term explanation is used to cover other accounts that have a certain relationship with the ideal accounts. At times, versions and portions of ideal explanations can also be considered explanatory.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004928615026
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,035
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
42 ( #161,059 of 2,312,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #480,900 of 2,312,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature