Religious Studies 44 (2):165-184 (2008)
(Forthcoming in Religious Studies) Abstract I argue that the Free Will Defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz., that (i) God intentionally necessitates all human actions and (ii) no human has it within their power to causally influence God’s will – is entailed by any version of theological determinism. Contrary to widespread opinion, therefore, the viability of the Free Will Defence does not depend upon the viability of libertarianism per se but on the falsity of theological determinism.
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